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Abstract 
 
This paper supplements analyses of Argentine transmission expansions at the federal 
level by looking at experience in Buenos Aires province. A Regional Electricity Forum of 
distribution companies has drawn up and begun to implement a ten-year transmission 
expansion plan. Contrary to previous fears, getting agreement between the members on 
investment and cost sharing has not been unduly problematic. More challenging was 
getting approval of the provincial government on funding. Deferring tariff reductions and 
using the revenues for investment facilitated the process, and now some innovative 
financing arrangements are underway. Again contrary to some previous suggestions, the 
controversial Area of Influence method was extended rather than replaced. This 
overcame concerns about free-riding. Progress and investment have been severely 
curtailed by the economic crisis in 2001 and subsequent federal government policy. The 
arrangements nonetheless appear to be working well, and to be conducive to more 
efficient transmission expansion. This confirms that it is practicable and advantageous to 
allow users rather than the transmission company or the regulator to propose and 
determine transmission investment, even in a meshed rather than radial system. An 
appropriate regulatory framework is needed to approve that part of the total budget to 
paid by distribution business consumers, but this does not require the regulator to lead or 
monitor the detail of the process. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As part of its electricity reform program in the early 1990s, Argentina introduced the so-
called Public Contest method. Decisions to initiate and approve major transmission 
expansions were not to be made by the concessionaires that operated these transmission 
systems. Nor were they to be made by the national and provincial regulatory bodies, 
which were given only limited powers to prevent or modify these decisions. Instead, they 
were made the responsibility of users of the various transmission systems: generators, 
distribution companies and large consumers. 
 
Although Argentine electricity reform is in general praised, the Public Contest method 
for transmission expansion has been viewed sceptically and indeed criticised.1 Among 
the concerns are the Area of Influence method used to identify users, allocate costs and 
determine their votes. The concern is that this method reflects usage of the system rather 
than economic benefits, hence can distort, complicate or delay investment decisions. 
Other concerns are that this method would be inapplicable or not as successful if applied 
to a meshed transmission system as in a radial one; that transactions costs including lack 
of information could preclude cooperation and efficient investment planning, especially 
where many parties are involved; that any centrally prescribed method of determining 
votes and cost allocation could fail to reflect local conditions; that distribution companies 
did not play as supportive a role as generation companies did, and perhaps could not be 
expected to do so given the difficulties associated with regulation of their costs and 
prices; and that the combination of this regulation and the Public Contest method would 
lead to inadequate or excessive investment in the transmission network relative to the 
distribution network. 
 
Recent research has challenged these perceptions.2 It has been counter-argued that the 
main instance of alleged delay (the Fourth Line) was in fact an uneconomic investment; 
that the process has generally been characterised by active and effective cooperation 
between users; that the Area of Influence method does not seem to have been a problem 
in practice; and that actions of the distribution companies, rather than indicating a 
deficiency in the Public Contest method, have been constrained by the stance of some 
provincial government regulators.  
 
The above research has focused on transmission expansion arrangements at the federal 
level in Argentina as a whole. The present paper is a study of transmission expansion 
arrangements in Buenos Aires province. This is of interest for a number of reasons.  
- First, whereas previous studies have concentrated on the national transmission 
system, where generators are the main users or beneficiaries, regional sub-
transmission systems are more geared to distribution (here, three main distribution 
companies and some 200 municipal distributors, mostly cooperatives of users). In 
                                                 
1 E.g.  Abdala (1994, 2007a,b), Abdala and Chambouleyron (1999), Abdala and Spiller (2000), Chisari et al 
(2001), Gómez-Ibáñez (2003), NERA (1998), Newbery (1999),  Woolf (2003), as summarised in 
Littlechild and Skerk (2007b). 
2 E.g. Galetovic and Inostroza (2007), Littlechild and Skerk (2004a,b; 2007a,b,c,d). 
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fact, the Area of Influence method identifies only users connected to the system at 
132kV and above, but in this province many distributors are connected below that 
voltage level (often embedded in the grid of another distribution company) and 
are therefore not identified by that method. 
- Second, whereas the generators and major consumers operate in a competitive 
market unconstrained by regulation, the distribution companies are constrained by 
price controls set by the provincial regulator, so that regulation plays a more 
critical role in this application of the Public Contest method.  
- Third, whereas it has been argued that the Area of Influence method would only 
work for radial networks like the national transmission system, the sub-
transmission networks are more highly meshed. 
 
Some advocates of greater decentralisation in network decision-making participated in 
the early discussions about transmission expansion arrangements in Buenos Aires 
province. Abdala and Spiller (2000) refer to the arrangements there as illustrating a more 
decentralized approach. The present study provides an opportunity to assess the 
conjectured reasons for adopting a decentralised approach and how effectively it is 
working.  
 
A combination of appraisals at the federal and provincial levels thus seems helpful in 
order to assess the applicability of user-determined network expansion policies in other 
countries and other infrastructure sectors. 
 
2. The electricity industry before reform 
 
Before the electricity sector was reformed, the federal government owned three electricity 
companies in Argentina, responsible for extra high voltage (EHV) transmission (mainly 
500 kV) and high voltage (HV) transmission (mainly 132kV), as well as most generation 
and the distribution of electricity in many parts of the country including Greater Buenos 
Aires. Most of the 23 provincial governments had their own electricity distribution 
company, in some cases also engaging in generation and in most cases operating some 
high voltage (132kV) transmission lines. Several hundred cooperatives throughout the 
country, in some cases partially owned by municipalities or large users, carried out some 
local distribution. 
 
The electricity companies negotiated their tariffs with the corresponding jurisdictional 
authority (national, provincial or municipal government). Their investments were 
financed from the net revenues of the businesses themselves and by soft loans or 
subsidies from the government, especially for expansions in rural areas.    
 
A Federal Electricity Council had been formed in 1960, comprising representatives of 
provincial governments and the Secretariat of Energy. It coordinated and administered 
various specific project funds created to develop the sector.3 The funds were primarily 
                                                 
3 The Electricity Regulation Act (Law 24065) provided for a surcharge, sometimes called a ‘stamp’, of up 
to $3/MWh on purchases by large users and distribution companies. Article 70 of that Law provided that 60 
per cent of these surcharge revenues would be distributed to provinces that adhered to the federal scheme 
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used for expansions and developments at 132 kV or lower, including low voltage grids, 
isolated generation in small towns, rural electrification and small hydroelectric power 
plants.  Some 3893 km of 132 kV transmission lines were approved and built from 1978 
to 1991.4  
 
3. Restructuring, privatisation and reform at the federal level 
 
At the federal level, electricity reform in Argentina largely followed the British model, 
though it went further in some respects (and also reflected previous reform experience in 
Chile). There was considerable structural and ownership separation of generation, 
transmission and distribution, particularly of the three large companies owned by the 
federal state. Most of the components were then privatised separately. A not-for-profit 
Wholesale Electricity Market Managing Corporation called CAMMESA was created as 
the independent system operator. A National Electricity Regulatory Agency called ENRE 
was also set up.5   
 
The federal transmission systems were restructured into one EHV transmission grid 
(mainly 500 kV) named Transener, and four HV regional sub-transmission grids (mainly 
132 kV), namely Transnea, Transnoa, Distrocuyo and Transcomahue plus the separate 
grid Transpa in Patagonia. Transener was privatised in 1993, and bought by a consortium 
including National Grid Company of the UK (which sold its stake in 2004). As explained 
shortly, an additional HV regional sub-transmission grid Transba in Buenos Aires 
province was created later when the provincial utility there was unbundled. Arrangements 
for the provincial electricity companies and the many municipal and local cooperatives 
varied considerably: some provinces followed the national policy, albeit with a time lag, 
while others resisted. For the most part, provincial governments retained responsibility 
for regulating the distribution companies in their provinces. 
 
4. The electricity industry in Buenos Aires province 
 
Figure 1 shows Transener’s EHV transmission network and the locations of the five sub-
transmission companies plus Transpa.  
 
The City of Buenos Aires (population 2.8m in 2001 census) has been the Federal District 
since 1880 and is no longer part of Buenos Aires province. The province of Buenos Aires 
(capital city La Plata) is the largest, most populated and often said to be the most 
prosperous province in Argentina. Its area is 303,000 sq km - about the same size as Italy 
but less densely populated. It has a population of 13.8m, of which 9.3m live in the 19 
municipalities and neighbouring areas known as Greater Buenos Aires. The Federal 
District and Greater Buenos Aires (total population 12.1m) thus contain one third of the 
36m population of Argentina. The federally-owned distribution company Servicios 
                                                                                                                                                 
for distribution tariffs, in order to subsidise customers. The remaining 40 per cent of the revenues would be 
directed to another Fund for electricity development in the country’s interior, including rural electrification. 
Littlechild and Skerk (2007a,d) 
4 Analysis by Mercados Energéticos. Investments are detailed by province at www.cfee.gov.ar.  
5 Bastos and Abdala (1996), Littlechild and Skerk 2004a, Pollitt 2004. 
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Eléctricos del Gran Buenos Aires (SEGBA), responsible for electricity distribution in the 
Federal District and Greater Buenos Aires, was sold as three separate companies: Edenor 
and Edesur (north and south Buenos Aires) and Edelap (City of La Plata and 
neighbouring areas). 6 They account for 43 per cent of total electricity demand in 
Argentina. 
Figure 1 Transmission networks in Argentina and Buenos Aires province  
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6 Their shares of demand in the electricity wholesale market are Edenor (20.7%), Edesur (19.0%) and 
Edelap (3.2%), together totalling 42.9% of market demand. CAMMESA Annual Report 2002. 
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Source: Transener and Transba and Mercados Energéticos 
 
This paper deals with the remainder of Buenos Aires province (that is, excluding Greater 
Buenos Aires and not including the Federal Capital), which has a population of 4.5 
million. It has about 1.4 million electricity consumers with a total demand of about 9500 
GWh/year, and is the largest electricity region in Argentina, accounting for 13.3 per cent 
of total electricity demand.7 The province has three main regions: the North, South and 
Atlantic Zones, as shown in the inset in Figure 1. 
 
Before the electricity reform, most of the activities related to electricity in Buenos Aires 
province were carried out by the provincial Department of Energy – the Dirección de 
Energía de Buenos Aires (DEBA). This included electricity generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply, together with regulation and more general government 
responsibilities in the sector. On 1 August 1990, as the first step in a reform process, it 
was decided to separate operation from regulation. A new provincial electricity company 
was formed in Buenos Aires province, called Empresa Social de Energia de Buenos Aires 
Sociedad Anónima (ESEBA SA). It was a vertically integrated company comprising 
those components of DEBA associated with generation (total 1100 MW), high voltage 
transmission (more than 5,000 km of transmission lines) and distribution (800,000 
customers, 7200 GWh/year). It supplied about two thirds of the province’s consumers.  
Over 200 municipal distributors (mostly cooperatives of users) supplied the rest of the 
consumers in the province. The distribution lines operated by municipal distributors were 
mostly at 33 kV and 13.2 kV. 
 
After the creation of ESEBA, the remainder of DEBA became the Ente Provincial 
Regulador de Electricidad (EPRE). This continued as the entity responsible for energy 
matters within the provincial government, including regulation and other responsibilities. 
 
5. Restructuring, privatisation and reform in Buenos Aires province 
 
In line with the continuing electricity sector reform process, and in response to internal 
financial pressures, Buenos Aires province took further steps in following federal 
guidelines at the provincial level.8 In 1993 the provincial government reorganised 
ESEBA for accounting purposes into a high voltage sub-transmission division, a 
distribution division and a generating division. In 1996 the provincial government 
formally unbundled ESEBA into a separate sub-transmission company (Transba), further 
divided the distribution division into three successor provincial distribution companies 
(EDEN, EDES and EDEA, in the North, South and Atlantic Zones, respectively), and 
divided the generating division into two successor companies (Central Piedra Buena and 
                                                 
7 The remaining six electricity regions of Argentina, some of which contain two or more provinces, range 
in size from Litoral (13.1% of national demand) down to Comahue (4.1%). CAMMESA Annual Report 
2002. 
8 During this period the financial accounts of Buenos Aires province were in deficit and the province was 
under considerable pressure to deal with this. In addition, substantial investment would be needed to update 
and expand the ageing electricity network in the province, which provincial revenues were unable to fund. 
Privatisation thus offered a means of financing and modernising the sector. 
 6
Centrales de la Costa Atlantica).  In April 1997 the three distribution companies - called 
provincial distributors - were privatised9 for a total of $969m.10  
 
In 1997, part of the provincial government functions of EPRE, including tariff 
calculations, were split off into a separate electricity regulatory body OCEBA.11 In 1999 
the remaining government responsibilities of EPRE were reconstituted as the Provincial 
Energy Directorate or Dirección Provincial de Energía (DPE). 12  
 
The regional sub-transmission company Transba had some 5000 km of lines, mainly at 
132kV (see Figure 2). In terms of line length it is the largest sub-transmission system in 
Argentina.13 After some discussion and change of plan (see below), it was privatised by 
international bid in August 1997. The purchaser was the now-privatised federal EHV 
transmission company Transener, which owns 90 per cent of Transba, with employees 
owning the remaining 10 per cent. During ESEBA’s privatization process Transba 
                                                 
9 EDEN and EDES were purchased by the US company AES, and EDEA by Inversora Eléctrica de Buenos 
Aires (which is jointly owned by Buenos Aires Energy Company 55% and United Utilities International 
45%). The shares of national wholesale market demand accounted for by these companies are EDEN 6.4%, 
EDEA 3.9% and EDES 2.9%, total 13.3%. CAMMESA Annual Report 2002. 
10 The $ symbol is used for both the Argentine peso and the US dollar. Until January 2002 the Argentine 
peso had parity with the US dollar. At the time of the economic crisis the peso fell to less than one third of 
the US dollar. At the time of writing (August 2007) the rate is 3.2 pesos (AR$3.2) to 1 US dollar (USD). In 
practice it is common to use a standardised exchange rate of AR$3 to USD. To minimise confusion, costs 
and revenues in this paper are typically given in Argentine pesos. 
11 In 1993 that part of DEBA excluding ESEBA became EPRE, responsible for regulation and other 
government functions, and operating within the Ministry of Public Works & Services. In 1997 a new 
provincial regulatory body was created called Organismo de Control de Energía Eléctrica de la Provincia 
de Buenos Aires (OCEBA). This had a similar regulatory role in Buenos Aires province to that of ENRE in 
the federal jurisdiction, focusing mainly on provincial and municipal distribution concessions and related 
tariff reviews. OCEBA’s responsibilities include tariff calculations, controlling activities under provincial 
jurisdiction, and dispute resolution.  
12 EPRE remained in place in 1997 and in 1999 was reconstituted as DPE, which now reports to the 
Ministry of Infrastructure, Housing and Public Services in Buenos Aires province.  DPE (and formerly 
EPRE) has the responsibility known as ‘autoridad de aplicacion’. In Argentina (and most of Latin America 
and Spain), this generally includes making rules for a given sector within the framework set by a law 
and the related decrees issued by the head of the executive branch (the president at federal level, the 
governors at provincial level). These laws and decrees usually contain provisions that allow their 
implementation.  DPE’s role is related to technical and administrative aspects. Among DPE activities 
are: 1) management of issues like rural electrification and use of renewable energy, 2) acting as the public 
sector counterpart of private organisations such as FREBA, in this case approving the transmission 
expansion plan, 3) compiling statistics, 4) issuing technical authorisations to build new facilities within the 
province, i.e. lines, substations, etc. and ruling on such matters, and 5) authorising rights of way for new 
lines. From a legal perspective, the Ministry of Infrastructure, Housing and Public Services is responsible 
for regulation. The DPE is specifically responsible for advice on energy matters. OCEBA monitors and 
controls compliance with all the rules and regulations that impact on the functioning of the electricity sector 
in the province. 
13 “TRANSBA S.A. is the concessionaire of the Electric Power Transmission System in the Province of 
Buenos Aires. The Company is also in charge of the operation and maintenance of the 132 kV grid in this 
Province, with the exception of the facilities placed within EDENOR S.A., EDESUR S.A., and EDELAP 
S.A. jurisdictions. Besides, TRANSBA S.A. operates and maintains not only the 500 kV Olavarría, Bahía 
Blanca and Campana Substations as TRANSENER S.A.’s Independent Transporter (TIBA), but also some 
66 kV facilities.” Transba website. For maps of Transener’s 500 kV EHV system, see Littlechild and Skerk 
(2004a,b, 2007a,b,c,d). 
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became subject to federal jurisdiction, and was henceforth subject to federal regulation 
via ENRE. This included the federal arrangements for transmission expansion.  
 
 
Figure 2 Map of Transba sub-transmission system 
 
 
Source: Transba website 
 
6. Arrangements for transmission expansion 
 
The federal regulatory framework put in place two sets of arrangements for the regulation 
of transmission systems: one for existing transmission systems and another for the 
expansion of those systems. Existing transmission systems (now including Transba as 
well as Transener) were subject to a price cap for a period of years, intended to encourage 
greater efficiency in operation and maintenance. These price caps were to be revised at 
periodic intervals by the federal regulatory agency ENRE. Although resetting Transener’s 
price control was not without difficulties, the method seems to have worked well, at least 
until the time of the macroeconomic crisis.14
 
The regulations specified various methods for approving and carrying out expansions to 
existing transmission systems, and further methods were added over time.15 Briefly, 
expansions intended for one or a few users could be carried out by Contract between 
                                                 
14 Gómez-Ibáñez (2003), Pollitt (2007), Littlechild and Skerk (2007d). 
15 For further details see Abdala (1994), Chisari et al (2001), Littlechild and Skerk (2007a,c,d). 
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Parties, that is, by agreement between the transmission operator or an independent 
transmission company, and the users who agreed to pay for the expansion. The 
transmission operator could identify and carry out Minor Expansions, defined as costing 
less than $2m for Transener, $1.5m for Transba. (The allocation of Minor Expansion 
costs would normally be agreed with the users or, if necessary, determined by 
CAMMESA at the request of ENRE.) There were separate arrangements for investments 
for Private Use. 
 
Major expansions to transmission systems, potentially affecting many parties, were to be 
carried out by the Public Contest mechanism. The potential users or ‘beneficiaries’ had to 
propose and approve expansions: existing transmission and sub-transmission operators 
were not allowed to propose expansions.16 The system operator CAMMESA identified 
the ‘beneficiaries’ using the Area of Influence method, which estimated the changes in 
flows on the system that would result from implementing the expansion in question. The 
identified beneficiaries would vote on any proposed expansion. If at least 30 per cent of 
beneficiaries supported the expansion, and less than 30 per cent of beneficiaries opposed 
it, the expansion could proceed. The regulator ENRE was required to check that this 
expansion passed the Golden Rule of reducing the sum of investment, operation and 
outage costs in the system as a whole.  (In practice no approved expansions have failed 
this Golden Rule test.) The expansion would then be put out to tender under a 
Construction, Operation and Maintenance contract. The bidder offering the lowest annual 
fee over a specified amortisation period (maximum 15 years) would win the tender. The 
concessionaire of the existing transmission system was allowed to bid if it wished to do 
so. 
 
Before reform, transmission had been characterised by excessive investment and 
operating costs. The aim of the new arrangements was to ensure that transmission 
expansions took place if, and only if, there was a sound economic basis for doing so. This 
was to be judged by users, who would have to pay for the expansions, rather than by the 
transmission concessionaire or the regulator. 
 
It was envisaged that generation companies and distribution companies would each have 
an important role to play in expanding transmission systems. Generators would have an 
incentive to ensure that they could transmit their power to the market, otherwise they 
would lose revenue. Distribution companies would have an incentive to ensure that they 
could import sufficient power into their systems and maintain the quality of supply, 
otherwise they would face penalties and in extreme cases the loss of the concession. Both 
types of entity would have an incentive to propose, support and pay for expansions 
necessary to provide sufficient transmission capacity, and to design and schedule such 
expansions in the most economic way. 
 
                                                 
16 In 1998, federal Resolution SE 208/1998 for the first time enabled the concessionaire of an existing 
transmission system to initiate a Public Contest process for certain limited expansions, mainly related to 
existing sub-stations. Such expansions were still subject to the approval of the beneficiaries. This 
Resolution also allowed the Secretary of Energy to propose security of supply expansions, and the scope 
for these was extended by later Resolutions. (Littlechild and Skerk 2007c) 
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In the event, generation companies did propose Public Contest expansions, often to 
overcome or reduce transmission constraints. But there was concern that an allegedly 
much-needed expansion (the Fourth Line) was opposed and delayed by other generators. 
There was also concern that distribution companies opposed a similarly needed Public 
Contest expansion to improve quality of supply (transformer capacity in Bariloche). This 
led to criticism of the Public Contest method, to suggestions that users could not in 
practice work together, and in particular to debate as to whether distribution companies 
could or would play the role envisaged for them in proposing and supporting quality of 
supply expansions. 
 
Subsequent research has shown that these concerns are largely unfounded.17 All the 
methods of transmission expansion were used increasingly, at least until the economic 
crisis. The Fourth Line was unprofitable when first proposed, and the users subsequently 
worked well together to design an acceptable proposal. In the Bariloche case, the relevant 
provincial regulators had indicated their disapproval of the proposed expansion.18 Many 
Public Contest expansions were proposed and supported, attracted competitive bids and 
reduced the cost of expansions. Typically, they led to more efficient use of existing 
capacity rather than to the building of new lines.  
 
With some modifications, these arrangements continue to obtain. However, since the 
economic crisis at the end of 2001, and particularly after the pesification and freezing of 
tariffs in early 2002, they account for less investment in transmission. Instead, the federal 
government and Federal Electricity Council have assumed an increasing role in directing 
and financing transmission investment.  
 
7. Regulation of distribution companies in Buenos Aires province 
 
The role of provincial distribution companies and provincial regulators was of some 
importance in the success or otherwise of the federal scheme for transmission regulation. 
It was likely to be particularly critical with respect to expansions of sub-transmission 
systems, where distribution companies play a greater role. Experience in Buenos Aires 
province sheds light on the issues involved and how this province addressed the problems 
involved. 
 
When Buenos Aires province privatised its distribution companies, it put in place a 
mechanism (as did some other provinces) whereby these companies are held responsible 
for non-supplied energy due to failures of the transmission systems (as well as those due 
to failures of generation and of their own distribution systems). 19 This was intended to 
provide an incentive for the distribution companies to propose and support relevant 
transmission expansions under the Public Contest method. However, difficulties arose 
over the financing of such expansions.  
                                                 
17 Littlechild and Skerk (2007b,d,e), Galetovic and Inostroza (2007) 
18 Littlechild and Skerk (2007d). 
19 In addition, in Buenos Aires province, any penalties paid by Transener and Transba for non-supplied 
energy have to be passed through to end-users by the distribution companies: the distribution companies do 
not retain these penalty payments to assist in financing transmission investment.  
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The original intention of Buenos Aires province was to retain its sub-transmission system 
Transba in provincial ownership. The province would continue to plan and determine the 
investment programme, which would be financed by a uniform surcharge or ‘stamp’ for 
use of the transmission system. This would be paid to Transba by the distribution 
companies and contained in their allowed tariffs. The stamp was expected to be around 
$1.50/MWh, which if applied to the whole demand in the province would yield sufficient 
to finance an initial transmission expansion budget of about $200m, which would cover 
the transmission needs of the province over a ten-year period. 
 
Potential investors in the provincial distribution companies then expressed concern about 
the continued provincial ownership of transmission because it would leave the supply 
conditions of the distribution companies (and hence their liabilities to penalties) 
dependent on public sector investment. Following negotiations, it was decided to include 
transmission in the privatisation process. This put Transba’s system, including the rules 
for expansion, under federal regulation. The uniform ‘transmission stamp’ was thereby 
ruled out as a means of funding transmission expansion. The transmission price control 
could cover only the cost of maintaining the existing system. It would now be for the 
privatised distribution companies to propose and pay for expansions of Transba (as well 
as Transener) under the Public Contest or other methods specified in federal regulation. 
 
This was an aspect of the Public Contest method that had not featured highly in 
discussions at the federal level. It was expected that generators would be the main 
proponents and funders of expansions in the EHV transmission system.20 In Buenos 
Aires province, and several other relatively populated provinces, the situation was 
different insofar as distribution companies were expected to be among the main 
beneficiaries and hence proponents of transmission expansions to maintain quality of 
supply. 
 
There was then discussion whether the $1.50/MWh transmission stamp should be 
included in the tariffs of the distribution companies to enable them to carry out this role. 
But there was a concern that this could enable the distribution companies to vote for 
transmission expansions instead of investing their own revenues in their own distribution 
systems. This could bias the system from a technical perspective, increase the cost to 
customers, and unduly benefit the distribution company shareholders. To try to prevent 
this, the distribution companies might be required to seek the approval of the provincial 
regulatory body on each transmission expansion proposal. But this could mean a heavy 
burden of regulatory analysis and decision-making, there was no previous experience of 
such regulation or regulatory expertise available, and the consequent regulatory 
uncertainty would increase the difficulty of privatisation. The provincial government 
concluded that it was not appropriate to include the transmission stamp in the distribution 
company tariffs. 
 
                                                 
20 In fact, the location of the Area of Influence reference node in Buenos Aires province meant that the 
distribution companies in Greater Buenos Aires did not get a vote or pay directly. This led to concerns 
about that method. cf Chisari et al. (2001), Chisari and Romero (2007) 
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The price controls on the provincial distribution companies in Buenos Aires province 
thus made allowance for new investment in distribution, and for covering the charges of 
the existing transmission systems as they applied at the date of privatisation, but not 
(explicitly) for any further investment in transmission. These distribution companies then 
argued that they were not allowed the margin for new transmission investment (that is, 
the ‘transmission stamp’) that was envisaged at the time of privatisation. They said that 
the allowed margin between their distribution revenues and costs (the value added in 
distribution, or VAD) was not sufficient to cover investment in transmission as well as in 
distribution, so they could not afford to provide the necessary funds. This was a problem 
that needed to be addressed. 
 
 
8. The need for transmission investment and the initial challenges 
 
In 1998 there were reliability problems in particular areas of the Province, for example in 
supplying the Atlantic coast in the middle of summer. 21 There was a risk that inadequate 
transmission capacity in Buenos Aires Province would constitute a critical bottleneck. It 
became apparent that it was necessary to expand the capacity of the regional transmission 
(and distribution) networks in the Province so as to remove any bottlenecks in the system.  
 
This posed three initial challenges.  
- First, it was necessary to develop a new approach to determining transmission 
expansion, consistent with privatisation and the national regulatory framework, to 
replace the pre-privatisation approach based on central planning.22 In view of the 
meshed nature of the provincial transmission system, it was necessary to 
coordinate the various possible expansions that different parties might propose, in 
order to obtain the most efficient outcome for the province as a whole. It was also 
necessary to agree a Transmission Expansion Plan that would be implemented 
automatically, thereby reducing the regulatory burden and regulatory uncertainty. 
- Second, it was necessary to raise the funding for this investment. Given the price 
control situation just described, this meant persuading the provincial government 
as regulator of the distribution companies that it should allow these companies to 
raise additional funds for transmission investment and that customers should pay 
the costs involved via the distribution tariffs.  
- Third, it was necessary to convince the government that the money thus raised 
would be well spent, and on transmission projects rather than on other uses.  
 
The next few sections describe in turn how these three challenges were tackled, via the 
FREBA Forum, the Aggregate Tariff, and the FITBA Trust. We then move on to 
additional tasks that subsequently became apparent. 
                                                 
21 There was also a well-publicised failure of supply in 1999 by the company Edesur serving the city of 
Buenos Aires, when it was installing new distribution capacity. This was unrelated to the transmission 
issues discussed herein but nonetheless focused attention on quality of supply issues. 
22 Before privatisation of ESEBA, technical staff within ESEBA had planned the transmission network, 
placing high value on security and quality of supply and lower value on economy, and assuming that the 
provincial Treasury would pay for any transmission or distribution expansion that could not be met out of 
the tariff revenues. One of the aims of privatisation was to avoid the need for such Treasury support. 
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9. FREBA: The Regional Electricity Forum of Buenos Aires 
 
As the importance of the above three challenges became increasingly clear, in December 
1999 the three provincial distribution companies (EDEN, EDES and EDEA) and 11 of 
the largest municipal distributors (cooperatives) in the province formed themselves into 
the Regional Electricity Forum of Buenos Aires (Foro Regional Eléctrico de la Provincia 
de Buenos Aires, or FREBA). The transmission companies Transener and Transba were 
made advisory members. Over time other cooperatives joined the project, and FREBA 
now has 174 members. These members are responsible for supplying some 95 per cent of 
demand in Buenos Aires province (excluding Greater Buenos Aires).23
 
Among the objectives of FREBA are 
- to coordinate and select investment projects so as to improve and expand the 
distribution and transmission networks in the Province  
- to work with the relevant authorities in the development of proposed laws, rules, 
tariffs, the presentation of information and other related activities 
- to provide advice and information to its members and associates 
- to establish contacts with similar entities within and outside the country, for the 
purpose of interchanging information and services beneficial to the electrical 
sector of the Province. 
 
The main decision-making authority of FREBA, which approves or rejects proposed 
network investment projects to be funded by the organisation, is the general Assembly. 
Voting in the Assembly is proportional to the size of the company in terms of MWh 
demand. A Board of Directors of 7 members, elected annually by the Assembly, oversees 
the work of FREBA. These 7 members are appointed in proportion to the sizes of the 
member companies: 2 from EDEN, 1 from EDES, 2 from EDEA and 2 from the 
municipal distributors (cooperatives).  
 
The Board of Directors appoints a Technical Committee composed of 7 suitably qualified 
professionals and experts in the regulation and economic evaluation of electricity 
projects, plus an External Technical Advisor if required. (In practice the External 
Technical Advisor has not proved necessary to date.) Members of the Board and 
Committee all act on an unpaid basis (that is, they are remunerated by their companies 
rather than by FREBA). The functions of the Technical Committee are to  
- select the investment projects in accordance with a specified mechanism;  
- verify that the proposed projects meet the technical requirements of national and 
provincial legislation;  
                                                 
23 25 large users but only 5 generating stations (total capacity 755 MW) are directly connected to Transba’s 
network. (Two additional generating stations with total capacity 970 MW are directly connected to 
Transener’s EHV network.) The province imports most of its electricity and hence depends on good 
transmission networks. The directly-connected generators and large users are not precluded from 
membership of FREBA, but to date none have become members. In almost all cases that might be put to a 
vote under the Public Contest method, the FREBA distribution companies have sufficient majority to carry 
their proposals. 
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- circulate among the members of FREBA the characteristics of the proposed 
projects and the opinions of Transba and Transener as Advisory Members (so as 
to facilitate the formation of coalitions among the Associate members of FREBA 
for the purpose of competitive selection among these projects); and  
- discuss and express opinions on any objections or claims for compensation that 
members of FREBA might present before the voting and final approval of the 
projects.  
 
A particular benefit of FREBA has been the development of better relations and better 
trust and understanding between the members, including advisory members Transener 
and Transba, and a willingness to work together to solve common problems. This was 
actually envisaged in the design of the technical committee and of FREBA itself.  
 
10. Design and approval of the transmission expansion plan 
 
No medium or long-term transmission plan was publicly available before the sector 
reform policy began. Federal regulation then obliged each transmission company to 
present to Cammesa in November of each year a Reference Guide with suggested 
expansions required (in its view) to maintain quality of service over the next eight years. 
However, the transmission company had no power to implement these expansions. The 
purpose of the Reference Guide was to provide transparent public information for the 
benefit of the relevant decision-makers.  
 
Transba’s first Reference Guide was produced in November 1997. In December 1999 
FREBA began to work on its first integrated transmission plan for the Province. It took 
account of the Reference Guide and was assisted by engineers from Transener and 
Transba among others.24 In general FREBA’s recommendations did not differ 
significantly from those of the transmission companies. However, there was some 
difference of emphasis: where alternative solutions to a problem were available the 
transmission company tended to prefer the one that yielded higher revenues or greater 
convenience for that company whereas FREBA looked for the overall least cost solution. 
This is illustrated below with some actual examples. Nonetheless, as a result of working 
together, FREBA and Transba generally resolved their differences, and from December 
2000 onwards Transba’s (eight year) Reference Guide and FREBA’s (ten year) 
Transmission Expansion Plan were fully consistent. The same was true for those aspects 
of Transener’s Reference Guide relating to Buenos Aires province. 
 
The distribution companies took the view that they had better information about the 
likely growth of demand, and therefore should determine what measures should be taken 
to deal with this. In their view, once FREBA had approved the Plan and the Provincial 
Government (Ministry of Infrastructure) had declared it financeable out of the Aggregate 
Tariff (see next section), the distribution companies could adjust the timing of an 
                                                 
24 E.g. Transba’s “Study of short and medium term expansion alternatives for the Buenos Aires Trunk 
[Regional] Transmission System, considering the grid structural problems under N & N-1 conditions” (for 
FREBA), 2000, listed at http://www.transba.com.ar/en/index.htm. 
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expansion in the light of demand growth. They feared that a transmission company would 
be less sensitive to such variations in demand growth. 
 
By December 2000 FREBA had put together a Transmission Expansion Plan. In 
principle, the Plan began in 2000/01 and terminated in 2010/11, so it was envisaged that 
it would meet the transmission investment needs of the province for ten years, including 
the necessary financing. The Plan comprised the following elements: 
- new works to meet the “N” condition, including the construction of 810 km of 
132 kV line, 1100 MVA transformers and 125 MVAr compensators; 
- new works to meet the “N-1” condition, including 800 km of 132 kV line and 370 
km of 500 kV line, 1680 MVA transformers and 330 MVAr compensators; 
- repowering of 65 MVA transformers to meet the “N” condition; 
- repowering of 800 MVA transformers to meet the “N-1” condition. 25 
At that time, the estimated cost of the Plan was some 225m pesos in total. 
 
11. Funding for transmission investments 
 
In order to fund the selected transmission investment projects, FREBA’s original idea 
was that an initial list of projects would be selected, and there would be two sources of 
contributions. First, each distribution company would make a mandatory contribution to 
cover part of the cost of this list, pro rata to its own share of total demand (in MWh) in 
the province.26 This would serve to indicate the commitment of the distribution 
companies to the process, and also provide an initial ‘critical mass’ of funds. Second, 
there would be funds collected from a special tariff component charged to end customers 
(later called the Aggregate Tariff).27  
 
Both these sources of funds would be put into fiduciary accounts, one for each 
distribution company, usable only through a trust fund and under the management of 
FREBA.  The funds in each company’s fiduciary account would be used only towards 
transmission investments serving the customers of that company. A distribution company 
could make an additional voluntary contribution from its own resources if it wished to 
ensure that a particular project went forward where the funds in its own fiduciary account 
would not otherwise be sufficient to cover that project.  
 
FREBA originally proposed to the provincial government that at most 90 per cent of 
investment costs should be covered by the special tariff charged to end users, so that the 
distribution companies themselves would have to contribute at least 10 per cent of the 
                                                 
25 The N condition means that the required standards of service are met with all the lines in the network in 
service. The N-1 condition means that these standards are met with all but one of the lines in service. 
(Hence the N-1 condition is more onerous than the N condition.) 
26 See also Abdala and Spiller (2000), para 3.1.2. This initial mandatory contribution would not be allocated 
to any particular project unless so decided voluntarily by its contributing member in the Assembly, at the 
time of selecting and approving projects. 
27 The term ‘pass-through funds’ is also used for this component. However, it is important to emphasise 
that this was not the same concept as in UK and other utility regulation, where specified costs such as 
energy purchases are automatically passed-through to customers as incurred on the basis that they are 
outside the control of the utility. This distinction is discussed further below. 
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cost of transmission investment from their own revenues in the form of the mandatory 
contribution. This was to provide an additional incentive on the distribution companies to 
select worthwhile projects and to ensure that the projects were constructed and operated 
economically and efficiently. It would also help to reassure the provincial government 
that the special tariff funds would be well spent, and that the scheme would be consistent 
with the responsibilities established at the time of privatisation.  
 
As explained in section 7 above, distribution companies complained that the distribution 
price controls made no provision for the special tariff component charged to end-users to 
finance transmission expansions. The distribution companies and cooperatives therefore 
proposed to the provincial government that instead of the end-user tariff reductions 
scheduled to take effect in February 2001 and 2002, the tariffs should be held constant 
and the resulting increments in revenue should be put into a fund for transmission 
investment. The provincial government accepted this idea in December 2000, per 
Provincial Decree 4052. The revenue contribution is known as the Aggregate Tariff.28 
This seems to have been recognition by the provincial government of the merit of the 
distribution companies’ argument. 
 
In the event, the 10 per cent mandatory contribution from the distribution companies did 
not materialise. The main reason was that the pesification and freezing of distribution 
tariffs at the beginning of 2002, at a time of rising costs of certain inputs, made it 
impracticable for the distribution companies to contribute from their own funds in the 
way previously envisaged.29  Also, the revenues from the Aggregate Tariff were 
sufficient to generate sufficient critical mass to initiate the system.   
 
In principle there still remains the possibility of an additional voluntary contribution from 
a particular distribution company. This would be a means of implementing an investment 
of interest to that company if other companies preferred to use the available funds in a 
different way, or if its Aggregate Tariff revenue does not provide sufficient funds to pay 
for it. In practice, however, there has not been a need for “voluntary contributions” as 
such. There has been consensus among the companies as to how to use the funds. Where 
a distribution company’s Aggregate Tariff revenue has been insufficient to pay for an 
agreed project, in some cases the company has advanced funding from its own resources, 
and then begun to recover this over time from the Aggregate Tariff revenues. In other 
                                                 
28 In practice, only the tariffs to small and medium-sized users were amended in this way because of a tax 
asymmetry between national and provincial systems. The province took the view that increasing the tariffs 
of the large commercial and industrial users would provide undue incentive for these users to leave the 
tariff market and enter the competitive wholesale market, which the province wished to avoid. (Distribution 
companies acting as transmission providers to large users that had decided to buy in the wholesale market 
became subject to federal rather than provincial regulation.) Nevertheless, when a transmission expansion 
is envisaged in the area in which a large user is situated, the distributor supplying that area negotiates with 
the large user to pay a part of the cost. Sometimes this is successful, sometimes not.   
29 Tariffs were frozen at the previous level in pesos rather than at the new dollar equivalent level, even 
though much of the borrowings and some of the ongoing costs were denominated in dollars or linked to 
dollar-related prices. (Actually, freezing of distribution tariffs was a decision of each province under the 
umbrella of the national emergency law. Consequently, each province retained the right to set distribution 
tariffs independently of national policy on this matter. In the event, Buenos Aires province followed the 
federal government in this matter.) 
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cases the company has borrowed from other companies against the security of future 
Aggregate Tariff revenues (see below). 
 
 
12. FITBA: Financial trust for investments in Buenos Aires province 
 
To ensure that the funds from the Aggregate Tariff are indeed used for transmission 
investments, and not used for other purposes by companies or the government, FREBA 
created a Financial Trust for Investments in Transmission in the province of Buenos 
Aires (Fondo Fiduciario para Inversiones de Transporte de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, 
or FITBA). The members are the three provincial distribution companies EDEA, EDEN 
and EDES, plus 167 municipal distribution companies (cooperatives). (FREBA is 
encouraging its remaining 4 members to join FITBA.) Funding presently comes from the 
provincial and municipal distribution companies (typically via the Aggregate Tariff). 
Potentially, in future, there could be funding by external investors in the Financial Trust.  
 
The organisation of FITBA is tailored to the characteristics of the members, the details of 
their concession contracts, the contributions of each distribution company to FITBA and 
the estimated amounts of the investments in question, and the coordination needed to 
select and approve projects. FITBA ensures that the available funds are held without 
incurring risk and spent only on approved investments.  
 
The main use of the funds of FITBA is to pay the costs of constructing projects approved 
by FREBA and eligible for financing out of the Aggregate Tariff. To that end, the 
financing has to be approved by the DPE on behalf of the provincial government.30  
 
The provincial government needed to assure itself that the funds would be well spent. 
However, beyond approving the concept (and hence the amount) of the Aggregate Tariff, 
it did not seek to influence the extent, allocation or timing of the investments. The 
FREBA/FITBA scheme has thus provided a degree of information, coordination and 
security about future transmission investment and funding that is not equally true of the 
federal approach31 or of the approaches of some other provincial governments. 
 
 
13. The next tasks and the economic crisis 
 
                                                 
30 Provincial government approval is needed in order to use the Aggregate Tariff resources for transmission 
expansion. Resolution MOSP 120/2002 (and more recently Resolution MIVySP 316/2004 and related 
Resolutions) approved the overall transmission plan. There is a procedure for modifying this plan in order 
to allow further expansions. After receiving government approval for the general plan, the distribution 
companies request trust fund resources from FREBA for each particular project therein. After verifying that 
the request is in order, FREBA instructs the fiduciary agent (BAPRO Mandatos y Negocios) to make 
available funds in favour of those distributors and simultaneously communicates its decision to the 
Province. 
31 The federal government, which determines the availability of federal funds, and the Federal Council have 
increasingly decided where and when new 500 kV lines should be built. Littlechild and Skerk (2007c). 
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By December 2000 the three initial challenges had been met. FREBA presented its 
Transmission Expansion Plan to the Provincial Government. By Decree 4052/2000, the 
Buenos Aires Provincial Government approved the concept of the Aggregate Tariff to 
fund transmission expansions. 32 This enabled the companies to begin collecting the 
Aggregate Tariff as from February 2001, albeit at a negligible level until May 2001.33 In 
the same Decree the Government also approved the concept of organisations such as 
FREBA and FITBA. FREBA was subsequently recognised as a non-profit association in 
April 2001.34  
 
Three more tasks needed to be accomplished before the transmission investment program 
could begin.  
- First, the privatised distribution companies required a commitment from the 
provincial government to support the proposed Transmission Expansion Plan. 
They were concerned that the government might otherwise insist on different 
expansions. 
- Second, it was necessary to establish a clear default criterion for allocating the 
costs of transmission expansion between the three large provincial distribution 
companies identified by the federal Area of Influence method, and the more than 
200 smaller municipal distributors (mainly cooperatives) in the province that were 
connected at lower voltages.  
- Third, it was necessary to negotiate and sign a Financial Trust contract with a 
chosen financial institution that would administer the FITBA funds in accordance 
with FITBA rules. Its tasks would include receiving the Aggregate Tariff 
revenues, investing them until required, and releasing them as and when it was 
appropriate to do so. 
 
FREBA began to address itself to these issues during 2001. However, economic 
conditions became increasingly difficult. For example, constructors were no longer 
willing or able to extend credit and accept the financing risk of a project. The financing 
arrangement embodied in federal transmission regulation was the mechanism of the  
annual fee or canon by which payments to the constructor would not start to be made 
until the expansion entered into service and would then be spread over a specified period 
of up to 15 years. This was no longer viable. Constructors now needed to be paid in 
advance and during construction, with the final payment upon commissioning the project. 
Unless other financing could be found, this meant that FREBA could no longer embark 
                                                 
32 A decree is an official rule made by the executive power and signed by the provincial governor, which 
implies endorsement by other ministers. It is not a law but has higher status than a decision of an individual 
minister. Recently, Provincial Law 13173 of March 2004 modified some aspects of the original provincial 
electricity regulatory framework set up by Provincial Law 11769 of January 1996. In particular, it 
incorporated into this framework the modifications of decree 4052/2000, which now have force of law.   
33 To avoid migration of large consumers that were eligible to migrate to the wholesale market and buy 
direct from generators, the Aggregate Tariff was applied only to residential and commercial consumers. 
The rate was initially 0.001 peso/kWh for six categories of such consumers, rising in May 2001 to between 
0.003 and 0.010 pesos/kWh for 14 categories of consumers.  
34 That is, the Provincial Board of Juridical Entities of Buenos Aires Province granted FREBA recognition 
as a non-profit Civil Association. (The Board is the organisation that checks the legality and registration of 
associations that seek to be recognised as members.) 
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upon projects immediately and pay for them over time as Aggregate Tariff revenues were 
collected. Instead, it would need to defer the start of each project until sufficient 
Aggregate Tariff revenues had accumulated to cover its total cost. 
  
At the end of 2001 came the full macro-economic crisis. In January 2002 the peso was 
devalued from parity with the US dollar to more than three pesos to the dollar. Tariffs 
were frozen in peso terms.  
 
This had a further adverse impact on FREBA and transmission investment. Devaluation 
meant that costs increased (depending on the proportions payable in dollars and pesos). 
Prospective income from the Aggregate Tariff was no longer in balance with the higher 
cost of the Transmission Plan. (Indeed, even without the crisis it would only have been in 
balance if the scope of the Aggregate Tariff had been extended to include contributions 
from users that did not presently contribute, and from distribution companies 
themselves.) Moreover, the freezing of tariffs despite considerable cost increases after the 
crisis meant that distribution companies were no longer able to consider making 
contributions from their own funds. 
 
Nonetheless FREBA pushed ahead. On 14 March 2002 Resolution 120 announced that 
FREBA’s Transmission Expansion Plan was eligible for financing out of the Aggregate 
Tariff. 35 This provided the needed reassurance to the distribution companies about the 
commitment of the Provincial Government to the Plan. 
 
In May 2002, in response to a request by FREBA, Resolution 228 recognised the need to 
complement the Area of Influence method by a further method that would require the 
municipal distributors embedded in the provincial distribution networks to take their 
share of responsibility for the costs of transmission expansions that benefited them. It 
instructed the DPE to elaborate the method in detail. Over the next four months the DPE, 
assisted by FREBA, developed the Aportantes method (explained in the following 
section) which was approved in August and became effective when it was published in 
September 2002. 36
 
The signing of the financial trust took considerable time. It took about a year after the 
crisis to design and implement the fiduciary aspects of the scheme, including the 
specification of procedures and transparency requirements and the choice of banks, and 
to get provincial government approval. On 7 January 2003 a Financial Trust contract was 
                                                 
35 Such a resolution, issued by the Ministry of Infrastructure, Housing and Public Services (MIVySP), is the 
way in which OCEBA and DPE conventionally make public their decisions. 
36 Resolutions MIVSP 228 of 20 May 2002 and MIVSP 82 of 12 August 2002. See Metodología para 
calcular el aporte do los beneficiados en ampliaciones de sistemas eléctricos de transporte, EPRE (no date). 
La llave de la energia en nuestra provincia de Buenos Aires, Metodología de calculo de los aportes de los 
beneficiados en ampliaciones de sistemas eléctricos de transporte, de acuerdo de los resoluciones MIVSP 
228/2002, MIVSP 82/2002, DPE, September 2002. [Translation: Method for calculating the contribution of 
beneficiaries in expansions of electrical transmission systems in Buenos Aires province. The key to the 
development of energy infrastructure in our province of Buenos Aires, in accordance with the specified 
resolutions.] 
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signed with one of the business units of the Buenos Aires provincial state bank (BAPRO 
Mandatos y Negocios). 
 
The economic crisis seems likely to have delayed the achievement of the outstanding 
three tasks. On the other hand, one should not underestimate the time needed to deal with 
the novelty of the project (nothing of this kind had been attempted in the country before) 
and the multiplicity of public and private entities involved.  
 
14. The allocation of transmission expansion costs within the province 
 
To implement federal regulation of transmission expansions when the Public Contest 
mechanism is used, the system operator CAMMESA uses the Area of Influence method 
to identify beneficiaries and allocate costs between them.37 This means that beneficiaries 
are limited to those market participants directly linked to the transmission and sub-
transmission networks. This typically includes generators, distribution companies and 
some large users.  
 
However, the Area of Influence method does not extend beyond the 132 kV network. 
Therefore, it fails to identify as beneficiaries those municipal distributors (mainly 
cooperatives) embedded in the 66kV, 33 kV and 13.2 kV networks of the distribution 
companies and of other cooperatives. The demand of these municipal distributors is 
counted as part of the demand of the relevant distribution company, and the votes and 
cost allocations of the latter are calculated accordingly. No votes or costs are allocated to 
these municipal distributors.  
 
In Buenos Aires province, a good number of the 200 or so municipal distributors are 
embedded in the provincial distribution systems of EDEN, EDES and EDEA. The three 
provincial distribution companies were concerned about free-riding by these embedded 
municipal distributors: they wanted a default method for allocating the relevant parts of 
the transmission expansion costs to them.38 In addition, some method was necessary for 
taking account of the views and needs of these municipal distributors. 
 
This was a provincial rather than federal matter. The appropriate provincial arrangements 
would therefore complement rather than replace the federal provisions.39 The privatised 
                                                 
37 It is open to the beneficiaries to agree to modify the sharing proportions determined by the Public Contest 
method. However, in practice this has not yet been found necessary. 
38 For example, EDEN, one of the three provincial distribution companies, had earlier financed a new 
substation that also benefited smaller cooperatives, but was not able to get any contributions from the 
cooperatives. 
39 Thus, federal and provincial arrangements continued in parallel. For example, beneficiaries in Buenos 
Aires province that were directly connected to the transmission networks approved several major 
transmission expansions in Transener’s system under the Public Contest method, such as transformers at 
Ramallo 500/220kV and Campana 500/132kV. (Littlechild and Skerk 2007d Appendix) There was no need 
for involvement by FREBA in these cases. Another expansion in Buenos Aires province under the Public 
Contest method, which did not involve FREBA, was a new configuration of circuit breakers at Ezeiza 
substation in Greater Buenos Aires. The beneficiaries were the ex-federal distribution companies Edenor 
and Edesur, who were not part of FREBA. The scope of FREBA’s transmission plan is all those 
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distribution companies were keen that the specific provincial cost allocation method 
should itself be consistent with the Area of Influence method rather than compete with it. 
To deal with this issue, the provincial government passed a “Resolución de Aportantes” 
(Resolution about Contributors) in May 2002, requiring the DPE to prepare an 
appropriate method. This reflected an initiative of FREBA, which itself proposed the 
fundamentals of the Aportantes method, and the need for it as a default or fall-back 
method in the event of failure of the parties to agree on cost allocation.  
 
To implement the Aportantes method, DPE starts with the cost allocations for each bar of 
the 132 kV system as calculated by CAMMESA using the federal Area of Influence 
method. It then assigns shares of these responsibilities for expansions to the municipal 
distributors connected to the 33 kV and 13.2 kV networks. The Aportantes method 
reflects the benefits that the expansion generates for each such municipal distributor.  It 
does this using a ‘metaformula’ incorporating many aspects of each power facility 
connected to the network, including capacity, energy, quality (tension level, wave length 
i.e. harmonic and flicker, capacity factor), reliability, environmental quality, unit cost per 
capacity and unit cost per energy.  
 
The formula looks complicated. However, the principal determinant seems to be the peak 
load of each market participant. And since the Transba network is radial below the 132 
kV level, in practice the method is applied by calculating peak usage of each user at the 
node where an expansion is developed.   
 
The DPE is responsible for determining the contributions under the Aportantes method. 
In principle this calculation is revised each three or six months, to reflect the actual usage 
at any time, rather than the usage at the time of agreeing the expansion. As with the 
federal Area of Influence method, this means that future users do not ‘free ride’ on the 
decisions of present users. It also minimises the risk to cooperatives of their demand not 
growing at the expected rate.40
 
As with the federal Area of Influence method, the Aportantes method is used when the 
market participants identified by the method do not agree an alternative basis for sharing 
the fee. The intention of FREBA is to use the method in case voluntary agreement fails. 
However, it has already been used to allocate EDEA’s share of the annual fee for the 
Olavarría-Barker 132 kV line between the municipal distributors in its area.  It seems 
likely that, in practice, the Aportantes method will be used unless the parties find it 
unacceptable. It undoubtedly works better than having the regulator as an arbiter of last 
resort, since a regulatory decision would be more uncertain and open to challenge. 
 
 
15. Implementation of the transmission expansion plan 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
transmission expansions where at least one FREBA member is identified as a beneficiary by the federal 
method using the Area of Influence methodology.   
40 Users in aggregate still have to meet the cost of the monthly charge. The same is true of the Area of 
Influence method, in both cases with a few months lag. 
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The first major transmission project was the 139 km 132 kV line from Olavarría to 
Barker with associated works at a cost of about 10m pesos. The provincial distribution 
company EDEA initiated this expansion under the Public Contest method in 1999. 41 
FREBA accepted it as an integral part of the Transmission Expansion Plan drawn up in 
December 2000, so the project was eventually eligible for financing under the Aggregate 
Tariff. This line has been in service since spring 2001, improving the quality of service in 
the Mar del Plata and Atlantic Coast area. 
 
For reasons given above, particularly associated with the economic crisis, the 
implementation of other expansion projects was delayed until 2003. By December 2003 
45m pesos had been raised through the Aggregate Tariff, approximately 15m pesos in 
each of the first three years. But as a result of inflation, the Transmission Plan was now 
estimated to cost 626m pesos compared to the original estimate of 225m pesos. By 
December 2004 the fund had grown to 67m pesos, and future income was expected to be 
about 20 or 30m pesos per year, depending on the growth of electricity demand and the 
evolution of the Aggregate Tariff. As of March 2006 FREBA had accumulated 98.5m 
pesos and invested about 35m pesos.42 Its expected future income was still about 20m 
pesos per year, but the estimated cost of the Transmission Plan had now grown to 835m 
pesos.43   
 
At this point FREBA drew up a Priority Plan for 180m pesos, comprising the most 
important part of the total Transmission Expansion Plan. Having already invested 35m 
pesos and having nearly 65m pesos in hand, it sought finance for an additional 100m 
pesos. To that end it explored the possibility of bank loans secured against the future cash 
flow from the Aggregate Tariff. It began to negotiate with builders to delay cash 
payments in exchange for security against future cash flows. (Since 2001, the main 
problem with transmission expansions is ‘who finances’ rather than ‘who pays’.) FREBA 
also made representations to the Provincial Government concerning the level of the 
Aggregate Tariff. 
 
 
                                                 
41 The Olavarría – Barker line was proposed under the Public Contest method in 1999, with payment 
specified over a 15 year period. A public hearing was held on 10 February 2000. There was 100% support 
from the 12 beneficiaries, although EDEA accounted for 92.43% of the votes. The expansion was accepted 
8 March 2000, put out to tender in August 2000, and went into operation 18 October 2001. The initial 
tender specified a maximum fee of 1.4m pesos/year over 15 years. But after the expansion was first 
proposed, financing conditions became more difficult, and by 2000 no constructor was willing to extend 
credit for 15 years. The winning (and only) bid was from the company Cobra, for 2.2m pesos/year over 7 
years. ENRE approved this variation in the time period, declaring that the equivalent value of this bid over 
15 years was lower than the specified maximum fee. (Littlechild and Skerk 2007d) 
42 This 35m pesos spent includes the Olavarría – Barker line, four new transformers, three new substations, 
cold reserve payments to generation on the Atlantic Coast, and several minor expansions. 
43 FREBA made a small revision to the Transmission Plan in 2004 in response to an issue raised by the 
provincial regulator DPE. The Transmission Plan has also been revised and updated from time to time, 
mainly to accommodate the actual evolution of demand in each area insofar as this deviated from initial 
estimates. Resolutions 316/2004 (May 2004), 57/2005 (14 Feb 2005), 624/2005 (18 October 2005) and 
571/2006 (2 October 2006) approved revised Plans. The Plan includes the projects that have been 
completed or are underway as well as those yet to be implemented. 
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16. Resetting distribution tariffs 
 
The tariffs for the provincial distribution companies had been fixed at the time of 
privatisation for an initial period of ten years, from 1997 to 2007. They provided for a 
reduction in distribution tariffs over the five-year period to 2002. As explained, FREBA 
was able to persuade the provincial government that partially cancelling this reduction 
would provide an appropriate fund for transmission expansions. The resulting Aggregate 
Tariff was approved in December 2000 with effect from February 2001. This deferred the 
potentially more complex decision about how in principle a distribution tariff should 
provide for the appropriate extent and timing of funding for transmission expansion, and 
what the appropriate magnitudes would be for the companies in question. This issue 
would arise in the context of the distribution tariff review, originally scheduled to 
determine revised tariffs for the period 2007 – 2012.  
 
In the event, tariffs were pesified and frozen from February 2002, with indefinite 
duration.44 Discussions continued on the appropriate way to provide adequate funding for 
transmission investments. Certain limited changes were made, in response to these and 
other considerations, but did not go to the heart of this issue. 
 
For example, Provincial Law 13173 of 16 March 2004 changed Article 42a of Provincial 
Law 11769 to allow the cost of transmission and its expansion to be included in setting 
the distribution tariff. At the same time the Law imposed a new obligation (article 42b) 
on the regulator to maintain the tariff as low as possible compatible with the required 
quality of service. This reflected political resistance to an increase in tariffs. The Law 
also clarified and established the rights of the provincial government in the electricity 
distribution sector and imposed additional obligations on the distribution companies.45  
 
In August 2005 the provincial government decided to end the tariff freeze. In February 
2006 it changed the basis of the Aggregate Tariff from a fixed amount to a percentage of 
total allowed revenue. The percentage was set to raise the same Aggregate Tariff revenue 
as in January 2006. This meant that when allowed tariffs are adjusted, the value of the 
Aggregate Tariff would be adjusted correspondingly.  
 
                                                 
44 The 2002 Emergency Law made reference to renegotiating the contracts of the privatised utilities. The 
Provincial Government avoided discussion of renegotiation, preferring instead the concept of adjustment 
(unilaterally proposed by itself, which the utility could accept or not). In practice, neither concept has been 
taken forward to date. 
45 The provisions include: article 39 recognising the customer’s right to electricity service at just and 
reasonable tariffs; article 65(i) establishing the concept of minimum and vital supply (a minimum 
consumption associated with the right to energy of all inhabitants of the province of Buenos Aires, that is 
not subject to cut-off by the distribution company in the event of non-payment); provision for monitoring 
quality of service in real time and in advance (the regulator can ask distribution companies for their 
expansion plans) rather than just penalties in arrears if the quality of service obligation is not met; an 
obligation on distribution companies to provide more systematic and uniform accounts, reflecting a concern 
that they might be responding to the economic crisis by delaying investment in order to recover revenues; 
and constraints on financing conditions especially for distribution companies, to limit the amount of their 
debt so as to avoid financial problems. 
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The provincial government recognised that if the Aggregate Tariff remained frozen in the 
face of the increased cost of construction and the lack of financing, then many of the 
needed projects would not materialise. In order to carry forward the projects in the 
Priority Plan, Decree 1652 provided for a 165 per cent increase in the Aggregate Tariff as 
from October 2006. This represented an increase of only one or two pesos per month for 
most smaller consumers but increased the Aggregate Tariff revenue to about 70m pesos 
per year compared to the previous 20m pesos. As of June 2007 FREBA had collected 
156m pesos and had invested almost 75m pesos. This was double the 35m pesos invested 
in March 2006.  
 
The scheduled distribution tariff review got underway (albeit slowly) in January 2007, 
when the government set targets for end user tariffs over the next few years. The review 
applies to the three provincial distribution companies and thereby to the municipal 
distributors and cooperatives in the province, whose tariffs are capped by those of the 
provincial distributor in whose zone they are located.  
 
The review raises fundamental questions about the financing of transmission investment. 
For example, if the provincial government (or its regulatory bodies DPE and OCEBA) is 
to specify a levy or ‘stamp’ on distribution charges as originally envisaged, in order to 
fund transmission expansion, how is it to decide on the level of this stamp? Present 
thinking is that the level should reflect the cost and timing of a program of approved 
works. This would be allowed for in setting each distribution price control. As long as the 
‘postage stamp’ concept applies, this contribution will be proportional to the MWh 
demand on each distribution system. An arrangement like the Aggregate Tariff might 
therefore continue to be applied as hitherto.  
 
Recent experience has shown that the government has been disposed to adjust the 
Aggregate Tariff so as to enable a particular work or group of works to go ahead, as with 
the October 2006 increase to facilitate the Priority Plan.  There is no aim to reintroduce 
the controversial role of regulation – in appraising and approving particular transmission 
investment projects on an ad hoc basis - that the initial reform attempted to avoid. Rather, 
in light of the FITBA arrangements, it is envisaged that the regulator should simply 
approve the Transmission Plan designed and proposed by FREBA. The October 2006 
tariff increase was not to substitute the regulator’s view for FREBA’s, but to remedy a 
situation where the original arrangements no longer yielded sufficient revenue to take 
forward the originally approved Transmission Plan.  
 
The provincial government has also explored whether certain particularly large 
transmission projects proposed by FREBA, that have so far not been started because of 
lack of funds, could be provided with additional economic assistance or financing from 
the provincial state or by helping FREBA to obtain aid from multilateral organisations. 
The government’s ability to take forward both sets of projects was been delayed by the 
October 2007 elections but the next section describes how these developments are 
proceeding. 
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17. The situation today 
 
The first priority project at EHV level that has been held up for some time pending the 
receipt of additional funds is a 500 kV line from Abasto (near Buenos Aires) to Mar del 
Plata with associated works costing 320 m pesos. This is the 350 km line mentioned in 
the first Federal Transmission Plan (June 2000) “to solve the historical problems of the 
Mar del Plata city supply”, but shortly thereafter (November 2000) deleted from the 
Federal Plan. Buenos Aires province was perceived as less in need of federal support than 
the other provinces. (Littlechild and Skerk 2007c) For the moment, there is little prospect 
of this line going ahead. Accordingly, FREBA is financing 26MW of generation to cover 
the summer demand peaks on the Atlantic coast, assisted by an increase in the Aggregate 
Tariff in that area.46 There are also several other distributed generation projects in this 
region.47
 
The other priority project hitherto held back is a 500/132 kV substation transformer near 
to the town called 25 de Mayo, a 70 km 132 kV line from 25 de Mayo to Chivilcoy, and a 
new 500/132kV 300 MVA transformer at Bahía Blanca, costing 90m pesos in total. This 
project is likely to be realised thanks to a loan that the province has secured from the 
multilateral organisation CAF.48 This loan is envisaged to cover the substation 
transformer at 25 de Mayo and the 132kV line. Because it presently has access to better 
loan conditions than the private companies whose revenues are regulated, the provincial 
government rather than FREBA has borrowed the money and has to put the expansion 
out to tender. The government will collect the money from the Aggregate Tariff in order 
to repay CAF. It is hoped that an increase in the Aggregate Tariff will support the 
FREBA members’ 53% share of the new transformer at Bahía Blanca, with large users 
(non FREBA members) identified by the Area of Influence method paying the remaining 
47%.  
  
FREBA has recently coordinated its Transmission Plan with the projects proposed by the 
Federal Council. 49 FREBA’s immediate action plan is to speed up the approval 
                                                 
46 This 26MW comprises 18 small internal combustion engines commissioned by various parties, namely 
EDEA (10 units), a municipal distribution company (2 units), two cooperatives (2 units) and a generation 
company on the coast (4 units). Existing FREBA funds are being used to expedite the process, but these 
funds will be recovered by an increase in end-user tariffs of 0.0075 pesos/kWh for distributors in the 
Atlantic area as from September 2007.  This represents about a 5% increase in charges to customers. 
Resolution MIVySP 508/2007. http://www.diarioelcronista.com/Regionales/nota_seccion.php?id=35903. 
Once the cost has been recovered from customers the provincial state will take ownership of the generating 
units. 
47 ENARSA, a new state-owned company created by the federal government, is planning to install 15MW 
of new generation in EDEA’s Atlantic Coast area plus 40 MW of new generation at the Junín and Pehuajó 
nodes of EDEN’s Northern area. These plants are small internal combustion engines that burn diesel oil and 
that can be installed relatively quickly. In addition, ENARSA plans to connect a new barge-mounted plant 
of around 100MW at some point on the Atlantic Coast.  
48 The Andean Development Corporation (Corporacion Andina de Fomento, or CAF, at www.caf.com).  
49 More precisely, the Federal Council incorporated FREBA’s proposal into its Federal Transmission Plan 
II, which is basically a list (rather than a plan) of 132kV expansions in all provinces, replicating the concept 
of its 500kV Federal Transmission Plan. http://www.cfee.gov.ar/planfederal2.htm To date, this Plan II has 
not yet attracted Federal funding. 
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processes for projects before ENRE and the DPE50; to advance the technical appraisal of 
as many projects as possible; to develop the conditions that will make it possible for third 
parties to participate in the financing of FREBA’s Work Plan (which may require 
regulatory changes at federal and provincial level); to establish a regime of penalties for 
those members of FITBA who do not comply with their obligations; and to establish a 
regime whereby those who are not members of FITBA nonetheless comply with the 
fiduciary obligations (to ensure that the funds of the Aggregate Tariff are actually used to 
finance the intended transmission projects). 
 
FREBA’s longer-term objectives are to secure that all its 174 members participate in the 
financial trust FITBA (as of the date of writing only 4 members of FREBA are not 
members of FITBA); to integrate the Aggregate Tariff revenues of all its members into 
the FITBA trust fund (as opposed to any other fiduciary fund); to seek additional third-
party funding (from public funds, multilateral organisations and/or banks); and to 
reassess the Work Plan to make the total cost compatible with FITBA’s stable longer-
term revenue. (The Priority Plan of 2006 and the increased Aggregate Tariff revenue 
from October 2006 onwards are seen as transient measures in response to the distortions 
of devaluation and the tariff freeze.)  
 
18. The record of transmission investment 
 
What has been the overall impact of the FREBA/FITBA scheme on transmission 
investment in Buenos Aires province? Did expansion in Buenos Aires province take 
place to a greater or lesser extent than in other regional sub-transmission systems? Or to a 
greater or lesser extent after the reform compared to before it? Or was there some change 
in the nature rather than the quantity of the investment?  
 
It is by no means straightforward to answer these questions because there are several 
different types and sources of transmission funding, various different types of 
transmission investment project, many factors influencing the extent of investment, and 
no single source of data. And, importantly, the FREBA/FITBA arrangements that 
formally came into effect in 2003 were not fully operative in the first few years. 
Nevertheless, let us examine the data on the Transba website, and that CAMMESA and 
ENRE provide in their latest (2004) Annual Reports.  
 
Transba’s website (apparently not updated since 2002), lists 38 extensions made within 
Transba’s jurisdiction and commissioned between 1998 and 2002. Of these, 26 were 
Minor expansions, 8 were based on Contract between Parties (i.e. by agreement), 3 were 
made by individual parties, and one by the Public Contest method (namely, the Olavarría-
Barker 132kV line).51
 
                                                 
50 Although the provincial government does not need to approve each project once the general Work Plan 
has been approved, it has to enforce provincial regulations on environmental issues, and there is still a need 
to comply with the federal procedures under which Transener and Transba are regulated. 
51 Of the 8 expansions by Contract between Parties, 2 list 1 party, 2 list 2 parties, 2 list 3 parties, 1 lists 
“cooperatives” and 1 lists “cooperatives and large users”. http://www.transba.com.ar/en/index.htm 
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Table 1 shows CAMMESA’s record of the additions to transmission lines and 
transformer capacity in the five regional sub-transmission systems of the main Argentine 
electricity network. It distinguishes between Transba in Buenos Aires province and (in 
aggregate) the other four sub-transmission systems. To present a clearer pattern, the data 
are grouped in pairs of years from 1992-93 to 2003-04.  
 
Table 1 Sub-transmission capacity expansions 1993 to 2004  
Transco Capacity 
in 1992 
1993-
1994 
1995-
1996 
1997-
1998 
1999-
2000 
2001-
2002 
2003-
2004 
Transmission lines km      
Total excl Tba  4946 516 222 183 282 346 194 
Transba 4820 125 161 430 167 273 11 
Total 9766 641 383 613 449 619 205 
Transba % 49.4% 19.5% 42.0% 70.1% 37.2% 44.1% 5.4% 
Ave km/yr   320.5 191.5 306.5 224.5 309.5 102.5 
        
Transformer capacity MVA      
Total excl Tba  2786 215 164 345 244 362 164 
Transba 3278 320 190 35 440 100 30 
Total 6064 535 354 380 684 462 194 
Transba % 54.1% 59.8% 53.7% 9.2% 64.3% 21.6% 15.5% 
Ave MVA/yr  267.5 177.0 190.0 342.0 231.0 97.0 
Source CAMMESA Annual Report 2004 
 
In very round terms, over the twelve years 1993 to 2002 the total length of sub-
transmission lines increased by some 200 to 300 km a year, then fell to about 100km per 
year in 2003-04. Similarly, the total extent of transformer capacity increased by about 
200 to 300 MVA per year, then fell to about 100 MVA in 2003-04. These reductions 
presumably reflect the after-effect of the macroeconomic crisis. 
 
Transba in Buenos Aires province accounted for 49% of the lines in 1992, and 43% of 
the lines built from then until 2002. Yet during the subsequent two years it accounted for 
only 5% of the lines built. Similarly, Transba accounted for 54% of the transformer 
capacity in 1992, and 45% of the transformer capacity added from then until 2002. Yet in 
the subsequent two years it accounted for only 15.5% of new transformer capacity. 
 
There were marked variations from one period to another (and from one sub-transmission 
company to another.52 Nevertheless, expansion in Buenos Aires province was at a similar 
level to the national picture, and comparable to the other regional systems, at least until 
2002. But in the last two years 2003 - 2004, expansion there fell significantly with 
respect to both transmission lines and transformer capacity. This was not just relative to 
                                                 
52 There was also very great variance between the other four regional sub-transmission systems. For 
example, the increase in line length over the decade 1992-2002 varied from zero in Cuyo region and 8.7% 
in Comahue to 35.2% in NEA (North East) and 57.7% in NOA (North West). The corresponding increases 
in transformer capacity were 16.8%, 24.8%, 75.8% and 77.9% respectively. Source: CAMMESA Annual 
Report 2002. 
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previous investment in the province, which was true for all the systems following the 
crisis; rather, according to these CAMMESA data, investment in Buenos Aires province 
fell sharply relative to investment in other systems. 
 
Now consider the data provided by ENRE covering the same period. Table 2 presents this 
in the same format as Table 1. It shows the number of transmission expansion projects 
and the total value of transmission investment in the same regional sub-transmission 
systems.  
 
Table 2 Sub-transmission projects and expenditures 1994 to 2004  
Transco 1994 1995-
1996 
1997-1998 1999-2000 2001-2002 2003-2004 
Number of projects     
Total excl Tba 0 8 18 22 34 16 
Transba 0 0 7 20 14 8 
Total 0 8 25 42 48 24 
Transba %  0% 28.0% 47.6% 29.2% 33.3% 
Average no. 
projects/yr 
0 4 12.5 21 24 12 
       
Expenditure $2001m     
Total excl Tba 0 1212 36,434 34,321 42,957 5,930 
Transba 0 0 2,980 24,055 17,704 1,518 
Total 0 1212 39,414 58,376 60,661 7,448 
Transba %  0% 7.6% 41.2% 29.2% 20.4% 
Ave expend/yr 0 $606m $19,707m $29,188m $30,331m $3,724m 
Source ENRE Annual Report 2004 
 
With respect to the sector as a whole, the picture is not dissimilar to Table 1 although it 
shows more active growth. The number of transmission projects steadily increased from 
0 in 1994 to 24 per year by 2002. Then it halved. The total value of these projects 
increased to $30,000 m per year over the same period. Then it fell to one tenth of that 
level. As with Table 1, this presumably reflects the impact of the crisis. 
 
What is different from Table 1, however, is that Transba market participants did not take 
forward any fewer projects in 2003-2004, as a proportion of the total, than they did in 
previous years. In fact they took forward slightly more (33% compared to 27% overall in 
previous years). And the value of these projects was only slightly down as a proportion of 
the total: 20% compared to 28% in aggregate over the previous eight years. In other 
words, contrary to the CAMMESA data in Table 1, these ENRE data do not suggest that 
investment in transmission in Buenos Aires province fell sharply relative to investment in 
other systems. 
 
Reconciling these two sets of official data is beyond the scope of this paper. What can be 
said, however, is that there does not seem to have been an increase in transmission 
investment in Buenos Aires province in the two years 2003-2004, and if anything there 
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may have been a decrease. However, it is too soon to judge whether this measures the 
effect of the FREBA/FITBA scheme. Of the almost 75m pesos that FREBA has invested 
up to July 2007, only 10.5 m pesos were invested during 2003-04. The scheme had only 
just begun and the effect of the crisis was still felt. It is possible that transmission 
investment would have been even less in the absence of the FREBA/FITBA scheme, both 
in 2003-2004 and prospectively thereafter. 
 
19. Further discussion of the transmission investment record 
 
The actual pattern of investment in each transmission system reflects many factors 
including different rates of investment in the past and different rates of economic 
development.  In addition, underlying conditions were changing: the vigorous expansion 
of transmission in the state-owned period had come to an end by the late 1980s, and is 
unlikely to have been matched thereafter, even if there had been no changes in ownership 
or regulation. There were changes in ownership in Buenos Aires province, as well as in 
transmission regulation. We have explained above that the funds available for 
transmission expansion in Buenos Aires province were essentially determined by 
decisions of the provincial government (notably with respect to the Aggregate Tariff) 
rather than by the distribution companies themselves. And we do not yet have data for the 
subsequent years. So it would be premature to conclude that the FREBA/FITBA 
arrangements would necessarily be associated with reduced transmission expenditure. 
 
However, a reduction in transmission expenditure compared to what would otherwise 
have taken place would by no means necessarily be a criticism or weakness of such 
arrangements. Indeed, as the Cammesa Annual Reports show, the new transmission 
arrangements at the federal level led to a significant reduction in the building of 500kV 
transmission lines (with a corresponding increase in expenditure on transmission control 
systems). This seems to have been a more economic outcome, and it was a merit of the 
federal arrangements to have brought it about.53
 
The Transba website, albeit not up-to-date, indicates that not all transmission and sub-
transmission investment depends on the Public Contest method.  Over the ten-year period 
1992-2002, this method accounted for some 2160 km of the 2477 km investment in 
Transener’s 500 kV transmission system, but for only 329 km of the 2705 km investment 
in the regional companies’ 132 kV sub-transmission systems. Similarly, the Public 
Contest method seems to have accounted for only 300 MVA of the 2250 MVA 
investment in transformer capacity on Transener’s system, and for none of the 2415 
MVA investment in the regional systems.54 Much transmission and especially sub-
transmission investment thus derives from sources of funding other than the Public 
Contest method. 
 
                                                 
53 Littlechild and Skerk (2007b,d) 
54 ENRE Annual Report 2002, Littlechild and Skerk (2004b, 2007d). Note that the investment in 
Transener’s 500 kV transmission system under the Public Contest method includes two lines proposed by 
and for government-owned generating stations. 
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The precise nature of these other sources is unclear. Certainly there are other methods of 
expansion under the federal procedure, including Contract between Parties, Minor 
Expansions and Private Use. As noted earlier, these have been relatively numerous albeit 
smaller in individual magnitude. And in later years yet other methods of expansion have 
been added to the repertoire, primarily with a view to their use by government. 
 
In addition, the Federal Electricity Council referred to earlier was still responsible for 
disposing of revenues derived from a surcharge on electricity sales. This seems to have 
had a continuing and significant effect on transmission investment in some of the 
provinces. During the period 1992 to 2001 the Federal Council approved and built 1441 
km of 132 kV lines, of which 707 km were expansions in regional sub-transmission 
systems and 734 km were expansions in distribution networks.55 However, very little of 
the Federal Council investment was in the Buenos Aires sub-transmission system.56 The 
Mar del Plata line was explicitly deleted from the Federal Transmission Plan. The Federal 
Council concentrated its expansions in less affluent provinces and in rural and low 
voltage systems. 
 
In sum, for several reasons it is difficult to evaluate the impact of the FREBA/FITBA 
transmission expansion arrangements in Buenos Aires province at an aggregate level: the 
arrangements have been in effect for a relatively short time; all investment has been 
severely impacted by the economic crisis; many factors, both past and present, influence 
transmission investment; and the Public Contest method is only one of several ways of 
financing transmission investment.  
 
Is it plausible that the FREBA/FITBA arrangements would reduce the level of investment 
in transmission to an unreasonable level? The evidence suggests not: its extensive 
Transmission Expansion Plan was drawn up in consultation with transmission companies 
and Transba’s Reference Guide was later made consistent with it. 
 
Do the CAMMESA data suggesting a lower level of transmission investment in 2003-
2004 disprove this claim? It would be premature to conclude that. Quite apart from the 
inconsistency with ENRE data, the actual investment reflects the serious limitations 
imposed by the crisis and the funding available through the Aggregrate Tariff, which was 
less than would have been implied by FREBA’s Plan.  
 
Alternatively, was FREBA’s Transmission Expansion Plan perhaps too generous? Would 
the approach have led to excessive transmission investment under normal conditions and 
in the absence of the tariff freeze? Does the province’s ability to survive with 
considerably less investment than was planned indicate that the Plan was over-engineered 
and that the incentives to efficient investment in the FREBA/FITBA scheme are now 
poor? The counter-argument to this is that the Transmission Expansion Plan was based 
on maintaining quality and security of service, including building in a margin for delays 
                                                 
55 Analysis by Mercados Energéticos of Federal Electricity Council data at www.cree.gov.ar. 
56 In the period 1991-97 the Federal Electricity Council financed a 24 km 132kV line between Papel Prensa 
and Bardero with a new substation at Bardero. Another expansion of a 40 km 132kV line between Monte 
and Lobos with a new substation at Lobos was approved in 1998 but not built.  
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on particular projects, with sufficient lead times and allowing for indivisibilities in 
expanding capacity. In the absence of a comparable programme of investment, quality 
would gradually decline, at first almost imperceptibly and then more noticeably.  
 
In the event, quality and security do not seem to have declined, indeed they seem to have 
improved initially. 57  However, the limited extent of transmission investment in 
subsequent years has reduced these quality and security margins and the system is no 
longer compliant with the N and N-1 conditions.58 The FREBA plan would have 
provided the appropriate degree of security that does not at present obtain. From this 
perspective the Plan was not over-engineered and would have provided the appropriate 
degree of quality and security at least cost. 
 
 
20. The different interests of operators and users 
 
The arrangements in Buenos Aires province have both required and enabled users to look 
more carefully at the need for and nature of transmission investments. Because the users 
of transmission systems have different interests and priorities from the concessionaires of 
those systems, and from governments and regulatory bodies, these arrangements have 
impacted upon decisions about expansion, and in such a way as to yield more economic 
investments than would otherwise occur. Section 10 above noted that the transmission 
companies tended to prefer the solution that yielded higher revenues or greater 
convenience for that company whereas FREBA looked for the overall least cost solution. 
We now illustrate this by examining three related issues that faced the relevant decision-
makers Transener, the distribution companies, the federal government and the Buenos 
Aires provincial government (via the DPE). 
 
20.1 Henderson 500/220kV transformer 
 
Henderson substation in Transener’s 500kV transmission system contains a 500/220kV 
transformer feeding a 220 kV line from Henderson to Bragado and a 500/132 kV 
transformer feeding a 132kV system in the concession area of the provincial distribution 
company EDEN. In 1998, Transener proposed to install a second 500/220 kV transformer 
at Henderson substation in order to meet a prospective increase in load associated with an 
expanding steel factory in Bragado. EDEN and neighbouring cooperatives objected. It is 
unclear how far they considered that the expansion was premature, how far they were 
influenced by the lack of allowance for transmission expansion in their own price 
controls, and how far Transener proposed an expansion at an existing substation simply 
because the relevant regulation (Resolution SE 208/1998) did not allow it to propose the 
                                                 
57 The operating performance of the five regional sub-transmission systems in aggregate improved from an 
average of 3.4 faults/100km/year in the three years 1999-2001 to an average of 2.2 faults/100km/year in 
2002-2004. Transba had 3% fewer faults than the average in the first period and 15% fewer faults than 
average in the second period. Cammesa Annual Report 2004, p. 59. 
58 See the statements of Transener and Transba (most recently in a presentation at MIVySP on 19 July 
2007) showing that most of their lines and transformers are either at the limit of their capacity or actually 
overloaded. In consequence it is ever more difficult to retire facilities for preventive or corrective 
maintenance without compromising quality of service standards. 
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building of a new one. At any rate, Transener withdrew its proposal in the light of the 
objection and did not press the matter to a public hearing. 
  
Subsequently, under the Transmission Upgrade scheme for security of supply projects 
announced in Resolution 1/2003, Transener again proposed the second 500/220kV 
transformer at Henderson, at a projected cost of 15m pesos. The Secretary of Energy 
accepted it.59 Under the terms of this scheme, 30 per cent of the costs of the expansion 
were placed on the users as beneficiaries (regardless of their views), with the other 70 per 
cent of the costs being spread across the system as a whole in proportion to peak demand. 
This decision impacted on some of FREBA’s members. Because the project was not in 
FREBA’s Transmission Plan that had been declared financeable from the Aggregate 
Tariff, FREBA took steps to secure an increase in the tariff in the affected area in the 
north of the province to cover the 30 per cent share of the cost. The government also 
decided to use certain congestion revenues (the Salex Funds) to help finance these 
expansions.60 The Henderson transformer is now in service. 
 
This case suggests that the transmission operator, who does not have to pay for an 
expansion, tends to look more favourably on building in advance of demand than the 
users who do have to pay for it. The federal government (in the post-crisis years when 
policy was less oriented to users) later imposed the same transmission expansion that the 
beneficiaries had rejected, to be paid for by users in general.  
 
20.2 Reinforcing Transba network 
 
In order to meet increasing demand in EDEN’s area, two alternative schemes were put 
forward. The DPE proposed to build a new substation in Bragado, which would have 
necessitated double circuit 500 kV lines from there to the 500 kV transmission system 
(total length 2 x 60 = 120 km of 500 kV line). FREBA, in contrast, proposed the 
installation of a new substation (with a 500/132 kV transformer) at the town of 25 de 
Mayo, under the path of the existing 500 kV system, plus a 70 km 132kV line between 25 
de Mayo and the town of Chivilcoy. FREBA pointed out that to build the new substation 
near to the 500 kV system would be less expensive and would also allow improved 
supply conditions in other areas of the province as well as Bragado. After some 
discussion, the DPE, which no longer had the role of planning the electricity network, 
accepted the recommendations of FREBA, as did Transener and Transba. This case 
suggests that FREBA brought about a different and more economic expansion than the 
Provincial Energy Directorate would have done.  
                                                 
59 Resolution SE 106/2003, 28 February 2003: “Instalación de un segundo transformador en Henderson, de 
300 MVA 500/220/13.2 kV. La pérdida del actual transformador determina la existencia de una Energía no 
suministrada de largo plazo superior al 30% de la demanda durante 10 días. El abastecimiento de gran parte 
de la zona centro de la Pcia. de Bs. As. depende del mismo. $15.0m” [translation: ‘Installation of a second 
transformer at Henderson, of 300 MVA 500/220/13.2 kV. The loss of the existing transformer would mean 
lost energy in excess of 30% of demand for a period of 10 days. The supply of a great part of the central 
zone of Buenos Aires province depends on this transformer. 15m pesos.’] It is an interesting question 
whether the Henderson transformer is properly regarded as a security of supply project when it was 
originally proposed to meet a prospective increase in load. 
60 Littlechild and Skerk (2004b fn 35 p. 17 and pp. 47-9, 2007c) 
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20.3 Linking the two networks 
 
A third issue was how to link the proposed 500/132 kV transformer at 25 de Mayo to the 
existing EHV network. The transformer would be located beneath the two existing 
500kV lines between Henderson and Ezeiza. Transener preferred to link it to both lines, 
even though this would be more expensive, in order to increase operating flexibility and 
stability of the system. 61 FREBA proposed to link it to just one of these two lines, 
arguing that this would be more economic and still consistent with the relevant operating 
rules and stability limits. In the event, it was agreed that the transformer would initially 
be linked to one line; later, a second (twin) transformer would be linked to the second 
line.   
 
This case again suggests a difference in emphasis. The transmission operator, who does 
not have to pay the bill, tends to look more favorably on an expansion that minimizes 
operating problems and makes the system more stable. Transmission users, who do have 
to pay the bill, prefer a more economic solution compatible with the relevant regulations, 
even though this may not be so convenient for the operator.  
 
20.4 Implications 
 
These three examples illustrate the differences in perspective between the two sets of 
industry parties (transmission concessionnaires and users) and the two relevant 
governments (federal and provincial), and the possible impacts of the decision 
mechanism on investment decisions. They shed light on the effect of different 
institutional arrangements for proposing and approving transmission investment. 
Transferring the decision-making power to the users, rather than leaving it with the 
transmission operator or the provincial or federal government (the so-called regulated 
Transco approach), does make a difference. In general it seems likely to have influenced 
the pattern of investment in the direction of more economic expansions rather than those 
more convenient to the transmission operator or more politically appealing to the 
government. And drawing up their explicit Transmission Expansion Plan enables market 
participants better to defend a least-cost solution against alternative proposals geared to 
solving political problems.  
 
 
21. Expectations and Experience 
 
How does experience in Buenos Aires province compare with the concerns and 
expectations of its founders?  
 
21.1 Process of decision-making 
                                                 
61 Transener argued that opening only one of the 500kV circuits would unbalance load flows on these two 
major lines, which would mean problems for transmission system operation because of difficulties in 
calibrating protection devices. Transener therefore preferred to open both the 500 kV circuits at the same 
point.   
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It was expected that there might be strong differences of view and conflicts of interest 
among the market participants. In particular, it was feared that there might be problems in 
determining and agreeing the appropriate pattern of investment, particularly with a 
meshed network and in the presence of externalities.  To that end, FREBA’s constitution 
specifies in some detail the formal mechanisms for accepting or disapproving projects 
(circulating project details so as to facilitate the formation of coalitions for competitive 
selection of projects, with provision for objections and claims for compensation, etc).  
 
In practice, however, it has not yet been necessary to invoke these procedures since there 
has been a high degree of consensus among the members. Externalities were resolved by 
determining the most appropriate program of investments to maximise benefits for the 
province as a whole. The feared problems associated with failure to reveal preferences 
did not emerge. Concerns about free-riding were addressed by the Aportantes Method. 
The parties achieved a broad consensus, and unanimously approved the ten year 
Transmission Investment Plan. There was no need to choose the projects so that each 
company received an equal or proportionate share. The shares of funding determined by 
the Area of Influence and Aportantes methods were acceptable to all the parties. 
 
The real problem that the members actually faced was obtaining funds to expand the 
transmission system and, later, financing the construction. It was not the difficulty of 
reaching agreement as to how to use what funds were available.   
 
21.2 Area of Influence and Aportantes methods 
 
Some have suggested that the federal Area of Influence method is unsatisfactory because 
it determines votes and cost allocations on the basis of physical flows rather than 
economic benefits. The concern was that this would lead to inefficient patterns of 
investment. Others argued for a more decentralised approach in order to attain greater 
flexibility in allocating the costs of investment between the beneficiaries.  
 
A further concern was that, even if the Area of Influence method worked in Transener’s 
500 kV transmission network, this was still a largely radial network, and the method was 
unlikely to be appropriate in a more meshed network such as Transba’s sub-transmission 
network. In such a network there was likely to be a greater difference between the cost 
allocation determined by the Area of Influence method and the benefit that each market 
participant would derive from an expansion.  
 
Again, this was not a major problem in practice. In the event, it was not the specific and 
inflexible provisions in the Area of Influence method that impelled market participants in 
Buenos Aires province to introduce their own Aportantes method. And although some 
distribution companies complained about the fairness of the Area of Influence method, 
this was not their main concern.  
 
The Area of Influence method is in fact still used to allocate costs between the provincial 
users, even though it is open to FREBA to allocate costs as it may decide. The driver for 
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action was not the inappropriate allocations of the Area of Influence method (which have 
concerned some commentators) but the limited scope of them. The concern was that the 
Area of Influence method did not make provision for the onward allocation of 
transmission expansion charges from distribution companies to the cooperatives 
embedded within them. The parties therefore proposed the Aportantes method to extend, 
rather than replace, the Area of Influence method. 
 
A referee comments that the Aportantes method does not look as if it has good cost 
minimisation properties. But this is not its function. It is not designed and intended as a 
means of selecting least cost expansion programmes. The FREBA process for 
coordinating and selecting investment projects is the vehicle for securing cost 
minimisation. The role of the Aportantes method is to determine a fair and accepted way 
of allocating the resulting costs, in the absence of any other agreement between the 
parties.  
 
21.3 Funding 
 
It was initially envisaged that the majority of the funding for transmission expansions 
would come from a specific allowance in the distribution price controls. But distribution 
companies would also contribute some of their own funds (about 10 per cent) pro rata to 
the MWh demand on their own systems. This would provide an incentive to efficient 
selection and monitoring of investment, and indicate the commitment of the companies.  
 
In the event, the transmission expansion allowance was removed from the price controls 
before privatisation. From the companies’ perspective this meant that the provincial 
regulatory framework no longer made adequate provision for customers to pay the costs 
of justified transmission expansions. The distribution companies were unwilling to 
support any transmission investment, on the grounds that the provincial regulation made 
no allowance for the costs of this.  
 
Eventually, agreement was reached on transmission funding via the Aggregate Tariff. 
This was the crucial factor in enabling agreement and progress. Distribution companies 
have not had to fund the investments directly out of their own pockets. The question of 
what contribution was appropriate from each company or each set of customers has been 
removed from the debate. 
 
There is no suggestion that this adversely affected commitment or efficiency. If there had 
been less availability of Aggregate Tariff funds, it is possible that voluntary contributions 
might have emerged, especially if the penalties for supply failures had been higher.62 The 
efficiency incentives might then have been stronger. This might in turn have produced 
more conflicts between participants. But these are necessarily conjectures.  
 
                                                 
62 It has been suggested that the provincial regulator did not enforce standards and impose penalties on the 
distribution companies as severely as was originally envisaged. On the other hand, this may have been 
recognition that the companies did not have as much revenue to make transmission investments as was 
originally envisaged. 
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21.4 Tendering and finance 
 
All this investment takes place within the context of the federal regulatory framework for 
transmission. Projects are put to Public Contest or a Contract between Parties is agreed 
beforehand. For a large project involving many members, the preference is to use the 
Public Contest method. For a small project involving only one or a few members, an 
agreed Contract between Parties often suffices. In the latter case, too, it is usual to put the 
construction, operation and maintenance out to tender, looking for competition between 
constructors and/or providers in order to get the best possible price and to avoid conflicts 
of interest. 
 
There is already some learning from experience in this respect. Experience suggests that 
civil works can usually be done more cheaply by the cooperative in the area of the 
expansion but that transformers and other works benefit from being put out to tender. The 
custom is now to partition the expansion work and put the non-civil works out to tender. 
The distribution companies also learn from the experience of other members of FREBA, 
including by comparing offers. 
 
The arrangements allow greater flexibility with respect to financing than might initially 
appear. It is possible to establish loans between trust accounts, so that a company needing 
to fund an immediate investment can borrow from the account of another with funds 
available, at a mutually acceptable rate. Three such loans have already been made.63
 
21.5 Decentralized decision-making 
 
Abdala and Spiller (2000) have argued that decentralised systems of decision-making in 
common-pool networks can be more effective than a centralised system, and have cited 
the FREBA/FITBA arrangements in Buenos Aires Province as an example of this. How 
far does subsequent experience bear this out? 
 
Those authors argue that decision-making in a common-pool network such as electricity 
is problematic. Centralised solutions have the advantage of lower transactions costs and 
direct control of activities characterised by externalities, free-riding and property rights 
problems. But information asymmetries – specifically lack of knowledge of the 
preferences of the parties - mean that the chosen solution may not be the most efficient. A 
decentralised decision mechanism may be preferable, and may avoid politicization, 
although problems of free riding and transactions costs may remain. In transmission 
regulation specifically, it is difficult for a centralised agent to assess the preferences of 
agents. There are problems with leaving transmission investment decisions to the 
incumbent monopolist, or opening the market to competition, or creating transmission 
rights. A decentralised mechanism may be preferable if it can promote self-revelation of 
preferences among grid users and overcome various problems of transactions costs, the 
tyranny of the status quo, inefficient outcomes and free riding. 
 
                                                 
63 The Cooperatives of Colon and 9 de Julio have lent $0.7m and $0.78m, respectively, to the Cooperative 
of Lujan, and the Cooperative of Pergamino has lent $1m to the Cooperative of Chacabuco. 
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Those authors suggest that the FREBA/FITBA arrangements in Buenos Aires province, 
which at that time were in course of formulation, were triggered by two major regulatory 
flaws: federal procedures for transmission investment that relied on an administrative rule 
for cost allocation based on power flows rather than user preferences, and an ‘incoherent’ 
provincial level regulation for pass-through of transmission investment costs to end-user 
tariffs. They describe at some length the project selection procedure within FREBA, the 
consultation and compensation devices and the provisions for revelation of preferences. 
They identify free riding by smaller players as a potential problem area. 
 
It is not clear that the FREBA/FITBA arrangements were prompted by regulatory flaws 
associated with a centralised administrative rule. Rather, these arrangements aimed to 
provide a method for determining transmission investments and a means of financing 
them. As explained above, the criticised federal rule for cost allocation was in fact 
accepted and extended rather than rejected or replaced. This was to overcome the concern 
that the smaller municipal distribution companies and cooperatives embedded in the 
provincial distribution systems would free-ride on the provincial distribution companies 
identified as payers by the federal rule. The ‘incoherent’ provincial regulation, which 
made inadequate provision for funding transmission investment, was indeed a serious 
problem. Progress depended on making adequate provision for funding via the Aggregate 
Tariff. In practice, the detail of the project selection procedures within FREBA, the 
consultation and compensation devices and the provisions for revelation of preferences 
have not been critical factors. Indeed, there seems to have been general agreement within 
FREBA about which projects to select.  
 
In sum, the actual working of the decentralised FREBA/FITBA arrangements in Buenos 
Aires province differed in some respects from the early conjectures. But so far the 
arrangements do indeed seem to be successful, and the outcome to date seems more 
efficient and more reflective of the preferences of the users than the projects that would 
otherwise have been selected by the transmission companies themselves or by a 
regulator. We now examine this final point in more detail. 
 
 
22. A comparison with the regulated Transco approach 
  
Some might question the approach in Buenos Aires province. The constitution and voting 
scheme of the Regional Electricity Forum seem to be quite elaborate. The work needed to 
prepare, discuss and update a Transmission Plan and persuade the provincial regulator of 
its merits must be quite extensive. Funding was initially a problem, the FITBA trust 
arrangements impose additional obligations, and the Aportantes cost allocation method 
seems to be quite complex. Is all this worthwhile? Is it in fact significantly different from 
the conventional ‘regulated Transco’ approach? Is it less costly or more cost-effective? 
Would it not be simpler for the regulator simply to consult on a proposed expansion plan 
put forward by the Transco? 
 
Experience to date suggests that the arrangements in Buenos Aires province have led to a 
different and preferable process compared to the regulated Transco approach. In both 
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processes, it is necessary to prepare and consult on a transmission plan. FREBA seems to 
have looked further ahead (ten years as opposed to five years in the typical regulated 
Transco approach and eight years specified in Transba’s Reference Guide) and to have 
carried out a more comprehensive analysis (integrating distribution networks more 
thoroughly into the transmission analysis than a Transco would normally do). It seems 
unlikely that, in aggregate, the preparation and consultation could have been significantly 
less onerous or costly in a comparably thorough regulated Transco process. The process 
has led to better relations, trust and understanding between the members than had 
previously been the case. This is equally true with respect to the transmission companies 
too, where FREBA has involved Transener and Transba as Advisory Members. Such 
outcomes are also reported in other countries where negotiated settlements and 
constructive engagement approaches have replaced conventional regulation.64
 
Not only the process has been different and preferable, so has the outcome. There is 
limited experience to date, but this paper suggests several issues where the process has 
led to transmission investments different from those of a regulated Transco. Even if the 
same options are consulted upon in the light of expert technical advice, it does make a 
difference which party takes the final decision. The outcome of the process in Buenos 
Aires has been a transmission investment program more closely attuned to the needs of 
users than to the needs of transmission companies, regulators and politicians. 
 
Allocating costs via the Area of Influence and Aportantes methods has not been 
problematic in practice. Experience also suggests that the distribution companies have 
acted in a responsible and coordinated way with respect to the interaction between 
transmission and distribution investments and the sharing of costs.65  
 
Are the distribution companies a good proxy for the interests of end-user customers in 
designing transmission programs? Some have worried that if the distribution companies 
had to pay for the costs of transmission expansions out of their own pockets, there would 
be less transmission investment than customers really wanted. Others have worried that if 
the costs of transmission expansions could simply be passed through to end-user 
customers, this would induce distribution companies to make excessive investments in 
the transmission system relative to the distribution network, and at the expense of 
customers.  
 
The more policy-relevant question is whether the distribution companies constrained by 
the actual regulatory framework in Buenos Aires province are a better proxy for 
customers than would be the regulator or the Transco constrained by the conventional 
regulated Transco framework. The fears just mentioned might be valid if the associated 
regulatory arrangements actually applied in Buenos Aires province. But they do not.  
 
                                                 
64 Doucet and Littlechild (2006, 2007) 
65 For example, a particular transmission investment on the Atlantic Coast of the province removed the 
need for a distribution investment. It was agreed within FREBA that the distribution company (the 
cooperative of Pinamar) would contribute the avoided cost of the distribution network expansion, and the 
remaining cost of the expansion (a new 132 kV substation) would be paid for out of FITBA funds. 
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As regards the first worry, the requirement that distribution companies pay for 
transmission investment out of their own pockets was initially envisaged to constitute 
some 10 per cent of the required total transmission budget. In the event, even that small 
element proved infeasible. The distribution companies therefore had to negotiate with the 
regulator for a special allowance for transmission investment over a ten year period. Once 
that allowance (the Aggregate Tariff) was agreed, there was no reason for the distribution 
companies not to authorise its spending. Moreover, given their liability for penalty 
payments in the event of failures on the transmission system, it was in the interests of the 
distribution companies to secure needed transmission investment and to get the most 
effective allocation of investment for the total funds available. In fact, they have been 
assiduous in trying to secure additional transmission funding since the economic crisis 
rendered the initial budget inadequate. 
 
The second worry, that the distribution companies are incentivised to spend excessively 
on transmission, rings somewhat hollow in light of the severe funding limitations since 
the crisis. Putting that aside, the distribution companies do not in fact have a pass-through 
arrangement in the conventional sense (e.g. of fuel cost adjustments). Rather, the 
regulator earmarks a specified allowance for a period of time. In deciding the amount of 
that allowance, the provincial regulator has been every bit as conscious of the impact on 
customers as a conventional Transco regulator would be. Moreover, the distribution 
companies have been conscious that, insofar as they secure additional funding for 
transmission investment, the consequent increase in end-user prices may reduce the 
economic and political willingness to allow additional investment in the distribution 
networks, on which they can hope to earn a reasonable return. 
 
The users rather than the regulator or the Transco thus make the running in terms of 
designing the size and content of the transmission investment program. But a key 
regulatory input is to set a total allowance for transmission investment over a specified 
period of time. In this respect the process is not so different from the conventional 
regulated Transco process.  
 
There is one further significant difference from the regulated Transco model. Under 
conventional price cap regulation, the regulator identifies an efficient transmission 
investment program and incorporates an allowance for the cost of this in setting the price 
cap. In some cases, there is limited monitoring of the way in which that allowance was 
spent, or not spent. In the limit, it is open to companies simply to return part of the 
associated revenues to their shareholders as long as they continued to meet the prescribed 
quality of service standards. This has been a problem to which conventional regulators 
have increasingly had to respond, with increasingly complex monitoring and incentive 
schemes. In contrast, the FREBA/FITBA arrangements provide an explicit assurance that 
the earmarked revenues will be spent on the approved transmission investments (revised 
as necessary in the light of evolving needs on the system). In this respect, the Buenos 
Aires arrangements were ahead of the conventional regulated Transco approach. They are 
also simpler, and make better use of the knowledge and incentives of the distribution 
companies to monitor the investment program and revise it as necessary.  
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23. Conclusions 
 
The Public Contest method in Argentina transferred decision-making on transmission 
expansion from the transmission companies and the regulator to the users of the 
transmission systems, particularly the generators and distribution companies. This 
method has been much debated. Early evaluations were critical, but focused almost 
entirely on one particular expansion (the Fourth Line). More recent evaluations 
(including the papers in this Symposium) have been much more positive.  
 
Previous analysis has been limited to the operation of the Public Contest method at the 
federal level. The present paper has examined how the method has been applied in the 
province of Buenos Aires, where some different issues are raised. These include the 
viability of the approach when large numbers of distribution companies and cooperatives 
are involved, the applicability of the Area of Influence method for determining cost 
allocations and votes in a meshed rather than radial transmission system, the danger of 
distribution companies providing inadequate or excessive transmission investment, and 
the problems of provincial regulation. 
 
The paper shows that nearly 200 distribution companies of different types and sizes have 
cooperated with each other, and with the transmission companies and the provincial 
regulator, to develop and begin to implement a ten-year transmission expansion plan at 
national and regional level. The process and outcome seem to be more thoroughly 
prepared, and more closely geared to the needs of users, than would otherwise have been 
the case.  
 
Concerns about inadequate or excessive transmission investment reflect assumptions 
about the funding and incentive mechanism that do not in fact apply. The provincial 
regulator has determined an allowance in the distribution tariff (initially, in lieu of a 
scheduled tariff reduction) to cover transmission investment. These funds are being 
invested fully, conscientiously and efficiently, without conflicts between the parties. 
There are better incentives to apply and monitor this funding than in the conventional 
regulated Transco model. 
 
Some expected that it would be necessary and desirable to modify or replace the 
controversial Area of Influence method, not least to deal with the more highly meshed 
sub-transmission network. This was not found necessary. In fact, that method was 
extended - to allocate votes and costs to the smaller municipal distributors and 
cooperatives embedded in the larger distribution networks - rather than replaced.  
 
The approach in Buenos Aires province was still in its early days when it was hit by the 
economic crisis and subsequent federal government policy constraining funding. It is a 
testament to the approach that it has survived. In 2003-2004 there may have been less 
investment in transmission than previously, but it is too soon to judge whether this is 
typical. It remains to be seen how the deferred distribution tariff review will deal with the 
tradeoff between total investment in transmission expansion, which influences quality of 
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supply, and the implications for tariffs to customers. But the provincial government has 
demonstrated its willingness to allow tariff increases to fund transmission investments, 
and to explore alternative financing arrangements. The scheme has yet to be faced with 
significant conflicts between participants. But to the extent that the approach has been 
able to operate, it seems to be working well.  
 
Experience in Buenos Aires province to date thus extends and reinforces experience at 
the federal level. It shows that it is feasible for provincial and municipal distribution 
companies including cooperatives to design, agree, implement and monitor an efficient 
program of investment and expansion in national and regional transmission and sub-
transmission systems. This paper has argued that this approach is preferable to the 
conventional regulated Transco approach, particularly in terms of responsiveness to the 
needs of users, more economic investment, and monitoring of the chosen investment 
program. Importantly, it makes significantly less demands on the regulatory body, though 
there is still a role for regulatory input.  
 
There seems no reason why the limitations of the conventional approach or the strengths 
of the approach studied here are particularly characteristic of Argentina. Providing 
adequate but not excessive regulation is a challenge internationally. There would 
therefore seem scope to apply these ideas to both developing and developed countries 
elsewhere in the world. 
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